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I.  INTRODUCTION 
While a significant body of legal scholarship has emerged on 
appellate judicial opinion style,1 little systemic study has been given 
to examining the nature of modern American concurring opinion 
style.  Style is an ambiguous and eclectic concept, and the opinion 
style of Judge Richard A. Posner, former Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and oft-mentioned 
candidate to become a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is worth trying to delineate and to understand.2
In a series of three previous articles, I analyzed Judge Posner’s 
general opinion style during his “rookie season” as a federal 
appellate court judge,3 Posner’s inchoate dissenting opinion style 
over the course of his first decade on the court of appeals,4 and his 
maturing dissenting opinion style in his later years on the bench.5  
In this Article, I turn to Judge Posner’s concurring opinion style 
1 See Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner’s Appellate 
Opinions, 1981–82—Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an Extraordinary 
Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 656–84 (2000) [hereinafter Blomquist, Playing on 
Words] (referencing various views on judicial opinion style, including distinguished judges, 
professors, and attorneys). 
2 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing The Next Supreme Court Justice: 
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & 
G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking The Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 
(2005); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (as a 
Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279, 1299 (2007) (stating that “Richard 
Posner, who shows [up] at the top of almost every citation ranking of either judges or legal 
academics, shows up” as the most frequently cited judicial opinion writer by the United States 
Court of Appeals judges of the opposite political party). 
3 See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1. 
4 Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of 
Dissenting Opinions, 1981–1991—Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. 
L. REV. 73 (2004) [hereinafter Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style]. 
5 Robert F. Blomquist, Judge Posner’s Dissenting Judicial Oeuvre and the Aesthetics of 
Canonicity, 36 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2006) [hereinafter Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity]; see 
also THE QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS OF RICHARD A. POSNER (Robert F. Blomquist ed., forthcoming 2008). 
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during his first quarter century of appellate judging. 
The structure of the remainder of this Article, before my 
conclusion, is as follows.  First, in Part II, before taking up Judge 
Posner’s concurring opinions, I probe for a working description of 
the nature and motivations for modern American concurring 
judicial opinions by looking at previous legal scholarship and 
exemplars of judicial concurrence.6  In Part III, I analyze the 
published concurring opinions written by Judge Posner during 
1981–2006—his lifetime tenure to date on the federal appellate 
bench.7  Finally, in Part IV, I offer some general observations about 
Judge Posner’s concurring opinion style, and consider some 
implications of my study for better understanding the form and 
function of American concurring judicial opinions.8
II.  THE NATURE OF CONCURRING OPINIONS 
A.  Background 
Interestingly, and ironically, the etymology of the word concur 
starts in the fifteenth century as meaning “to run together, 
assemble, meet, rush together in hostility” and “[t]o run together 
violently or with a shock; to come into collision; to collide.”9  Over 
the ensuing centuries concur softened in meaning to also encompass 
“flow[ing] together, as streams (material or immaterial),” “[t]o 
converge and meet,” “[t]o combine in action, to co-operate,” and “[t]o 
agree in opinion.”10  The cognate word concurrence developed a few 
centuries after the first English usage of the word concur.11  
Concurrence came to mean “[r]unning together, confluence; 
meeting,” “[o]ccurrence together in time, of events or circumstances; 
coincidence; a juncture,” and “[c]ombination in effecting any purpose 
or end, or in doing any work; co-operation of agents or causes.”12
Indeed, a concurring judicial opinion can be testy—or even 
downright hostile—to the majority opinion from which it reacts; this 
is, perhaps, most probable in the case of a partial dissent and a 
partial concurrence combined in the same opinion.  In the case of a 
6 See infra notes 9–78 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 79–399 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 400–433 and accompanying text. 
9 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 675 (2d ed. 1989). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. at 676. 
12 Id. 
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pure concurring opinion, however, we would expect the opinion to be 
congenial to the opinion in chief of the majority or plurality—
although this can probably not be presumed; perhaps the 
concurrence agrees with the result or the reasoning of the court but 
takes the principal opinion of the court to task for not going far 
enough in expanding the holding, or for the opposite reason of going 
too far. 
The motivation of an appellate judge in writing a dissenting 
opinion—or even a partial dissent—is intuitively obvious (i.e., a 
dissenting opinion disagrees to one degree or another with the 
holding, reasoning, or combined holding/reasoning of the principal 
opinion in a case).13  The reason why a judge would go to the trouble 
of writing a concurring opinion—an opinion in agreement or partial 
agreement with the chief opinion of a court—is harder to fathom.  
One must assume that there are costs and benefits of writing a 
separate concurrence.  Costs include extra time and effort in the 
context of a pressing docket of cases and an expectation that each 
judge is responsible for writing a fair share of the opinions of the 
court, alienation or possible alienation of one’s judicial colleagues, 
and opening one’s concurring opinion to outside criticism by 
commentators and the press.  What might the broad theoretical 
benefits be of writing a separate concurring opinion?  No doubt 
there are reasons for writing a concurring opinion which overlap 
with writing a dissenting opinion: self-expression, advancing the 
truth, competing with other judges and academics in the legal 
marketplace of ideas, improving the majority’s final work product by 
forcing the prevailing side to deal with points raised in the 
concurrence, and mental honing of a judge’s agreement and 
disagreement with the majority’s approach to a particular legal area 
(e.g., freedom of the press issues).14  Moreover, one type of 
dissenting opinion, termed a “collaborative” dissent by Professor 
Charles Fried, is closely related to a concurring opinion since both 
attempt to work with the premises and reasoning of the majority’s 
approach as a cooperative effort to further shape the development of 
13 For a discussion of the various motivations an appellate judge might have for writing a 
dissenting judicial opinion, see Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style, supra note 4, at 76–83.  It 
should be noted that it is conceivable that trial court judges—when convened as a tribunal of 
special district court judges by statutory arrangement—may write dissenting or concurring 
opinions from the chief opinion of the tribunal; however, this is rare.  My assumption in this 
Article is that appellate judges write concurring or dissenting opinions when they choose to 
write separately from the majority or plurality of an appellate court. 
14 Cf. id. 
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future legal doctrine.15  In contradistinction, no cooperation is 
apparent in the case of the other kind of dissent, described by Fried 
as “oppositional” dissent.16
B.  Some Traditional Views on Concurring Opinions 
As pointed out in Robert A. Leflar’s Appellate Judicial Opinions, 
the use of concurring opinions by appellate judges “varies from court 
to court and from judge to judge.”17  Most legal observers probably 
share the view that concurring opinions should not be routinely 
issued and should “respect the doctrine of stare decisis” while 
suggesting “an evolution of legal principles required by changed 
conditions and concepts.”18
One author has suggested two scenarios that justify the writing of 
thoughtful concurring opinions.  First, “[u]pon occasion, the opinion 
of a majority will not actually be erroneous, yet it will verge upon 
error by straining a legal doctrine to its utmost.”19  In this context, 
“a considered and well-stated concurring opinion can be of value by 
warning that the doctrine must not be pressed too far.”20  Second, 
“[i]n other instances, a majority may announce a doctrine which is 
sound when applied to the facts before the court, but which would 
be wholly unsound if given a general application.”21  In this closely 
related instance, “a timely concurring opinion may suffice to check 
any extension of the doctrine, and thereby better our 
jurisprudence.”22
Another author, focusing on the work of the Michigan Supreme 
Court, addressed the problematics of a concurrence in result only 
that does not explain the basis of the concurrence.23  What are 
readers to make of such unexplained concurrences and are they 
helpful or unhelpful? 
When a [judge] concurs in result only, but does not bother to 
explain why he does not also concur in the opinions of other 
15 See Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 163, 180–83 (2002). 
16 See id. 
17 APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 203 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974). 
18 R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross Prize Essay: Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 
A.B.A. J. 821, 884 (1952). 
19 Id. at 823. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See Richard S. Miller, The Work of the Michigan Supreme Court During the Survey 
Period: A Statistical Analysis, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1964–1965). 
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[judges] who favor the same result, he leaves several 
possibilities open.  Perhaps he disagrees with the reasoning 
of the other [judges], believing it to be faulty.  If so, he would 
seem to have an obligation, possibly constitutional in nature, 
to set forth the correct reasoning as he sees it.  If his 
objection is to the scope or breadth of the decision or of some 
dictum in the opinion, his reasons might become very useful 
in restricting or broadening the effect of his brethren’s 
opinions in future cases.  Certainly the benefit of his 
different reasoning might prove helpful to other appellate 
courts considering a similar problem, or possibly to [the same 
reconstituted appellate court] reconsidering the same 
problem at some future date.24  
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing in a 1973 
article, opined that constitutional adjudication—at least in the 
Supreme Court of the United States—“invites, at least, if does not 
require, more separate opinions [by appellate judges] than does 
adjudication of issues of law in other areas.”25  This tendency to 
write separate concurring opinions, or dissenting opinions, 
Rehnquist theorized, exists because “stare decisis does not have the 
same weight in constitutional interpretation as in other cases” and 
there might be an incentive, therefore, of an appellate judge to 
“want to state his own views if they differ significantly from those of 
the majority [of the court].”26
24 Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).  The author of this article goes on to muse: 
 Perhaps [the concurring-in-result only appellate judge] is too busy with other opinions 
to waste his time reporting a minor disagreement.  Perhaps he agrees with the reasoning 
of his colleagues but dislikes the language they used to express it.  Or he thinks the 
opinion may be an unpopular one and does not wish to be recorded as joining it.  Perhaps 
he has not had an opportunity to examine the briefs and records carefully or to research 
the problem, but concurs in result simply because he feels, instinctively, that the 
outcome is correct.  No one, of course, is entitled to draw any of these conclusions from a 
concurrence in result . . . .  The point is, however, that anyone is entitled to conclude that 
[an appellate judge] had some reason for not joining his colleague’s opinion.  Such a 
concurrence provides no guidance and, unfortunately, casts a shadow on the 
authoritativeness of the signed opinion while leaving open a question about the motives 
of the concurring [judge].  A written opinion, even a brief one, setting forth [an appellate 
judge’s] reasons for concurring separately would eliminate these difficulties. 
Id. at 12, 14. 
25 Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361, 
363 (1973). 
26 Id. 
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C.  Recent Takes on Concurring Opinions 
Barry A. Miller suggests, in a 2002 article, that a customary role 
for a concurring opinion is to discern a legal issue “as relevant but 
decide[] that it is not dispositive and leav[e] it for another day.”27  
Miller cited a concurrence by Justice Kennedy in Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections v. Schacht as exemplifying this kind of 
concurring opinion.28
In an exchange between Professors Barry Friedman and Robert 
W. Bennett, in a 2001 law review symposium, both academics 
seemed to agree that while litigation is “party-centered,” other 
views of important legal and policy questions are raised by 
concurring judicial opinions (in conjunction with dissenting opinions 
and amici briefs).29  Accordingly, a concurring judicial opinion can 
play the role of a limited “conversation” about critical questions 
embedded in a democratic society.30  Sometimes, this conversation 
between jurists who render separate judicial opinions changes other 
jurists’ minds in future cases.31  Other, more cynical, observers 
contend that in some appellate courts—particularly the Supreme 
Court of the United States—judges are not really interested in 
using separate concurring (and dissenting) opinions for purposes of 
engaging in an open conversation with their colleagues; rather, 
according to this view, separate opinions are, now, routinely farmed 
out to law clerks for writing in a kind of one-upmanship display of 
competition between appellate judges more interested in rebutting 
or neutralizing the rhetoric of other appellate judges.32
27 Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1301 n.245 (2002). 
28 Id. (citing Wis. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“noting important questions but suggesting resolution in a later case following 
full briefing and argument”)). 
29 See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 845, 883–84 (2001); Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the 
Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 946 (2001). 
30 See Friedman, supra note 29, at 946; cf. Bennett, supra note 29, at 888. 
31 See Daniel Gordon, Brennan’s State Constitutional Era Twenty-Five Years Later—The 
History, the Present, and the State Constitutional Wall, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1031, 1034 n.35 
(2000) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
RETROSPECT 354–55 (1957)). 
32 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE 
EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 29, 271–73 (1998) (asserting that Supreme 
Court law clerks perform vital functions including drafting majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions, and exchange between the Justices in voting conferences is non-existent); 
Nadine J. Wichern, Comment, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media 
Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621, 652 (1999) (arguing that on the current Supreme Court, law 
clerks spend much of their time writing separate opinions with little supervision); Wichern, 
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With his Yankee common sense and his own considerable 
experience as a United States Court of Appeals Judge, Frank M. 
Coffin offers his unique take on when concurring opinions are 
justified in his 1994 book, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and 
Judging.33  Coffin compares a concurring opinion with a dissenting 
opinion: “A concurrence is like a fencing foil; it elegantly makes its 
usually bloodless points.  A dissent, on the other hand, is more like 
a broadsword.  It takes more resolution and commitment to wield it 
and there is the expectation of drawing at least a little blood.”34  As 
Judge Coffin sees it, appellate judges are vindicated in penning 
concurring opinions in four circumstances: 
 1. When a judge strongly prefers a different theory or 
ground to support the result, e.g., the judge would not reach 
the merits because of a procedural bar. 
 2. When a judge wishes to limit the holding, e.g., the judge 
concurs in this case involving the interstate transfer of 
prisoners but would not extend this to apply to an intrastate 
transfer. 
 3. When a judge wishes to expand a holding, e.g., the 
judge points out that the instant case by its reasoning and 
holding effectively overrules a precedent. 
 4. When a judge wishes to expand the majority’s reasoning 
on a particular point, e.g., the judge wishes to drive home a 
point to the bar or the trial courts, or to address a dissenter’s 
argument in a more thorough manner than would fit the 
court’s opinion.35
Professor Cass R. Sunstein, in his 1999 book, One Case at a Time, 
supra, at 652 n.226 (suggesting that an example of a situation where a law clerk was probably 
delegated the power to write a “concurring opinion in a case with large ramifications [was in] 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the assisted suicide case, in which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
wrote a concurrence qualifying the majority’s opinion by warning that the case did not mean 
there was a constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying” (citing Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–38 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
33 FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING (1994). 
34 Id. at 227. 
35 Id. at 226–27.  According to Judge Coffin: 
 A judge should never merely declare that she concurs.  This is no more 
illuminating . . . than two examples collected for a judges’ seminar . . . : 
 I concur in the result and so much of the opinion as supports the result. 
 And this gem, delivered by an Irish chief justice, after hearing the view of his two 
colleagues: 
 I agree with the decision of my brother on the right for the reasons stated by my 
brother on the left. 
Id. at 227 (endnote omitted); cf. supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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highlighted the pivotal role played by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
through her use of “minimalist” concurring judicial opinions on the 
Supreme Court.36  According to Sunstein, Justice O’Connor came to 
be known for characteristic minimalist concurrences that “typically 
limit the reach of majority decisions, suggest ways of 
accommodating both sides, and insist to the losers that they haven’t 
lost everything, or for all time.”37  Professor Mark Tushnet 
amplified Sunstein’s insights about the role of concurring opinions 
on the Supreme Court in his foreword to the Harvard Law Review 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s 1998 Term.38  Professor Ronald 
Dworkin largely agrees with Sunstein’s insight that concurring 
opinions on the Court often serve to narrow the scope of the 
majority opinion.39
Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, in a 1997 article,40 analyzed a 
concurring opinion by Judge Guido Calabresi in United States v. 
Then41 as an example of a “constitutional flare to Congress.”42  Then 
involved a case that presented the question of “whether the 
sentencing disparity between persons convicted of crimes involving 
crack and powder cocaine constituted a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s implied guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”43  
Judge Calabresi used a concurring opinion to the Second Circuit 
rejection of Then’s constitutional attacks on the sentencing disparity 
to warn Congress that a future case might prove to be 
unconstitutional.44  As explained by Professor Krotoszynski: 
 Judge Calabresi [in his concurrence] was very careful not 
to give a formal opinion as to how the court would resolve a 
later case involving his hypothetical facts.  He simply noted 
that the existence of compelling evidence demonstrating a 
racial linkage would give a reviewing court pause, should 
Congress maintain a stance of benign neglect or, worse yet, 
[allow the 100:1 ratio to continue] notwithstanding a 
36 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
xiii (1999). 
37 Id. 
38 Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of 
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 93–94 (1999). 
39 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, Sept. 25, 1997, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1078. 
40 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and 
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
41 See 56 F.3d 464, 466–69 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
42 Krotoszynski, supra note 40, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Id. at 13. 
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Sentencing Commission proposal to revise the disparity 
downward.  Judge Calabresi rhetorically raised two 
questions: (1) Precisely at what point does a court say that 
what once made sense no longer has any rational basis? and 
(2) What degree of legislative action, or of conscious inaction, 
is needed when that (uncertain) point is reached?  
Significantly, Judge Calabresi made no attempt to answer 
his own questions.  On the contrary, he admitted that their 
very existence powerfully counseled in favor of restraint.45
For Krotoszynski, Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion in Then 
was justified.  Contrary to the panel majority taking Judge 
Calabresi “to task for offering Congress advice on its core policy-
making functions,”46 Professor Krotoszynski supports Judge 
Calabresi’s concurring opinion as a type of traditional dialogue 
between the judiciary and Congress.47  Moreover, “judges routinely 
offer opinions on matters of constitutional law in various ways,” 
according to Krotoszynski, “including dicta, alternative holdings, 
and concurrences.”48  From a broader philosophical perspective, 
“[g]iven that federal judges must write opinions that attempt to 
justify their rulings, the question of how much to write cannot be 
avoided.  Some judges will write more, some will write less.”49  Some 
will write concurring opinions.  Some will choose to remain silent. 
Professor Henry T. Greely performed a quantitative analysis of 
the career judicial opinions of Judge John Minor Wisdom of the 
United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit in a 1996 article.50  
Greely made the interesting observation that Judge Wisdom 
exhibited an “increasing willingness to write separately in en banc 
decisions”51; two explanations for this tendency are: (1) the natural 
45 Id. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted).  Krotoszynski went 
on to observe: 
 Rather than simply ignore the mounting data that augur against the constitutionality 
of the disparity, Judge Calabresi [in his concurring opinion] was remarkably candid.  In 
his view, the Sentencing Guidelines ratio might be heading toward unconstitutionality in 
light of changed circumstances.  But he clearly and expressly reserved final judgment.  
At the end of the day, he confessed that future circumstances might, or might not, 
provide sufficient support for a claim similar to the claim pressed by Then. 
Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 16. 
48 Id. at 34. 
49 Id. (footnote omitted). 
50 See Henry T. Greely, Quantitative Analysis of a Judicial Career: A Case Study of Judge 
John Minor Wisdom, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1996). 
51 Id. at 118. 
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contentiousness of cases set by the full circuit court for rehearing en 
banc, and (2) the greater importance of en banc decisions compared 
to panel decisions to the “law of the circuit.”52  Thus, over twenty-
five percent of Judge Wisdom’s concurring opinions on the Fifth 
Circuit “were written in response to en banc decisions of the 
court.”53  Generalizing his data collection to United States Circuit 
Judges in all appellate circuits, Professor Greely noted that 
“[a]lmost all [circuit] judges write more dissenting opinions than 
concurring opinions, but not all.”54  Moreover, Greely pointed out 
that “judges sampled from the Ninth and the District of Columbia 
Circuits seem to write separately much more often than . . . other 
circuit[] [judges].”55  Offering comparisons with other circuit judges, 
including Judge Posner, Professor Greely concluded: 
 Overall, Judge Wisdom’s separate opinion profile seems 
most like that of his old friend Judge Tuttle of the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, Judge Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit, and 
Judges Cummings and Posner of the Seventh Circuit.  Each 
of those judges writes separately about 10% of the time and 
writes separate concurrences quite infrequently.  Beyond the 
fact that all those judges are well respected, it is hard to find 
other similarities between them.56
United States Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker made an incisive 
point in an article entitled In Praise of Footnotes about the 
important role that footnotes play in concurring or dissenting 
judicial opinions.57  As Judge Becker sees it, footnotes in separate 
opinions can be strategically deployed by an appellate judge to “call 
into question the correctness or prudence of a rule of law espoused 
by the majority opinion, or [to] advocate a new or different rule.”58  
Becker explains how a footnote in a concurring or dissenting opinion 
can maximize the potential future impact of a separate judicial 
opinion by observing: 
Opinions of this genre, if they are to have their intended 
effect of law reform, must perforce be scholarly and 
detailed; . . . footnotes often play an important role in 
scholarly exegesis.  Footnotes make it possible to define 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 129. 
57 Edward R. Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7 (1996). 
58 Id. 
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confusing terms and to explain potentially confusing but 
extraneous procedural issues that seemed important at one 
point but later turned out not to be dispositive.  They also 
make it possible to set forth unobtrusively jurisdiction or 
standard of review . . . , and to identify analogous but 
unconnected proceedings (explaining their relevance).  These 
matters are of especial value to the novice reader.  Finally, 
footnotes can even be used to inject some humor into an 
opinion or to offer an interesting aside.59
In a fascinating 1995 student note, Igor Kirman focuses on the 
proliferation of concurring opinions by United States Supreme 
Court Justices.60  Kirman observes that “[f]luctuating from a low of 
one in 1937 to a high of ninety-five in 1981, the rising incidence of 
concurring opinions [by Supreme Court justices] suggests a need to 
understand their role in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence.”61  
Moreover, “[c]ontributing to this need,” according to Kirman, is the 
impact that some concurring opinions by Supreme Court justices 
have had on the evolution of legal doctrine on the Court.62  Kirman 
distinguishes between two fundamentally different kinds of 
Supreme Court concurring opinions: (1) a concurrence in judgment 
which is “[w]ritten by a Justice who does not join the majority 
opinion” and “is intended to express agreement with the majority’s 
result but not with its reasoning,”63 and (2) a simple concurrence 
which “is written by a Justice who agrees both with the majority’s 
result and with its reasoning, but [who] writes separately 
nonetheless.”64  While Kirman’s differentiation of types of 
concurring opinions is driven by his concern for elucidating the 
precedential value of various concurrences by Supreme Court 
Justices,65 his analytical framework also sheds light on appellate 
59 Id. (footnotes omitted).  Judge Becker, however, acknowledges the negative view Judge 
Posner holds for footnotes in judicial opinions: “‘The principal appeal [of the footnote] is to the 
author . . . . [sic] it spares him the pain of having to discard anything he considers to have 
some value or interest, and it enables him to show, or at least pretend, that he is hard-
working, learned and scrupulous.’”  Id. at 11 (footnote omitted). 
60 Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme 
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995). 
61 Id. at 2083 (footnotes omitted). 
62 Id. at 2083–84, 2084 n.7 (citing as an example Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
63 Id. at 2084.  “The concurrence in judgment is really a dissent from the rationale of the 
majority opinion.”  Id. 
64 Id. (footnote omitted). 
65 Id. at 2119.  The “two-step inquiry” will allow “lower courts [to] minimize the 
precedential chaos that results when they give decisional force to a concurring opinion that 
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concurring opinion styles, in general.  For example, it is instructive 
to pay closer attention, on the one hand, to what a concurring 
appellate judge is claiming she is doing (say, a judge who contends 
that she agrees with the majority’s result and reasoning), and, on 
the other hand, to what a concurring appellate judge is functionally 
doing in the actual language of her concurrence.  For example, she 
departs from the reasoning of the majority opinion by being more 
expansive or restrictive than the holding—as opposed to merely 
clarifying, restating, or summarizing the majority’s opinion.  
Indeed, while all separate appellate opinions (pure dissenting, 
partial dissenting and concurring, and pure concurring) can be read 
for shades of meaning and types of ambiguity, it would appear that 
separate opinions labeled as concurrences by judicial authors—in 
whole or in part—are likely to contain the most complex layers of 
ambiguity.  This is because an appellate judge who claims that he is 
concurring with the majority opinion (partially or completely) is 
overtly or covertly attempting “to inspire consubstantiality” through 
the use of the rhetorical trope of a concurrence; such a rhetorical 
strategy by an appellate judge is “designed to unite” members of the 
majority and the concurring judge or judges “in spite of members’ 
divergent tendencies,” requiring “persuasively encompassing 
competing values at a sufficiently abstract level.”66  Thus a 
rhetorical trope, like a judicial concurring opinion, is similar to 
Professor David Zarefsky’s discussion of a “condensation symbol” 
which has “no clear referent but serve[s] to ‘condense’ into one 
symbol a host of different meanings and connotations which might 
diverge if more specific referents were attempted.”67
may be at odds with its corresponding majority opinion.”  Id. 
66 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 24 (Thomas O. Sloane ed., 2001). 
67 DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S WAR ON POVERTY: RHETORIC AND HISTORY 10–
11 (1986).  There are, alas, many rhetorical uses of ambiguity.  By way of illustration: 
[T]he U.S. Constitution and many diplomatic agreements depend on their ambiguities to 
provide flexibility without sacrificing unity.  Like rhetorical tropes, especially irony, 
humor and puns rely on their measure of ambiguity to advance strategically a point or to 
inspire consubstantiality. 
 Argumentative strategies, such as association and disassociation, operate by 
maneuvering ambiguous interpretative boundaries.  Association attempts to link 
meaningfully referents formerly viewed as unrelated and thus create a fresh interpretive 
and evaluative context for the issue at hand.  Disassociation strategically divides that 
which is interpreted currently as unitary into distinct parts that invite divergent 
evaluations.  Transcendence and transformation operate similarly, strategically 
changing the scope and circumference of a phenomenon’s interpretive borders and so 
redefining meaning. 
 Another . . . . rhetorical use of ambiguity is to deny its presence.  Declaring that a 
purportedly ambiguous issue actually is not so may be designed to convince auditors to 
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Professor Scott C. Idleman, in a 1995 article, touches on the 
function of appellate judicial concurring opinions in his discussion of 
judicial candor.68  According to Idleman’s analysis, progress in “the 
long-term doctrinal or conceptual development of the law”69 may 
arguably be advanced by encouraging judges, who choose to write 
separately from their respective courts, to “plant[] seed[s]” or 
“squirrel[]” away ideas for “new principles or doctrines in 
subsequent . . . cases.”70  Idleman cites Judge Posner for the 
proposition that concurring opinions (along with dissents) “‘have 
played so important a role in the development of the law that it 
would be a great error to suppress them; it would actually make law 
less rather than more certain, by concealing from the bar important 
clues to the law of the future.’”71
Professors Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, in a 
jointly authored 1993 article in the California Law Review, 
undertook an ambitious project which offered important insights on 
the need for appellate courts, as collegial enterprises, to reconcile 
votes by individual judges on the outcome of the overall case with 
the views by these judges on each of the issues in the case (provided 
by concurrences of one sort or another).72  Considering this problem 
with special reference to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
support the rhētōr as a leader clear-sighted and determined enough to steer them 
effectively through this troubling “apparent” indeterminacy.  Finally, a rhetor 
strategically may highlight ambiguity’s presence, then argue that it is impossible to 
resolve it satisfactorily, even temporarily.  This tactic serves to block agreement on a 
proposed judgment or course of action.  
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC, supra note 66, at 24 (citations omitted).  See generally WILLIAM 
EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY (Chatto & Windus, 3d ed. 1963) (1956) (widely 
recognized as the last century’s landmark opus systematizing and defending literary uses of 
ambiguity). 
68 See Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 
(1995). 
69 Id. at 1370. 
70 Id. at 1370–71 (footnotes omitted). 
71 Id. at 1371 n.205 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
236 (1985)).  Idleman, however, is ultimately skeptical about encouraging judicial candor too 
much because of countervailing considerations of judicial restraint.  Id. at 1372.  In 
concluding his article on judicial candor, Idleman quotes an old article by Robert A. Leflar, 
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 819 (1961): 
Candor . . .  
“is a virtue, in judicial opinions as elsewhere, and we need much more of it.  But to ‘tell 
all,’ with complete and unmitigated candor, is not always a virtue in judicial opinions 
or elsewhere.  Restraint may be a virtue too, for reasons sometimes of decency and 
sometimes of wise planning.” 
Idelman, supra note 68, at 1416. 
72 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
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Kornhauser and Sager make a whimsical but vital conceptual 
distinction between what they call “true concurrences,” on the one 
hand, and “two-cents concurrences,” on the other. 
 “True” concurring opinions . . . are not measurably less 
problematic than dissents, since they are dissents from the 
rationale adopted by the majority.  “True” concurrences 
announce and defend the author’s unwillingness to subscribe 
to the majority’s rationale for an outcome that the author 
supports.  By contrast, in “two-cents” concurrences, the 
author is willing to join in both the outcome and rationale 
sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add her own, 
presumably consistent, thoughts on the matter.73
Interestingly, “[i]n Supreme Court practice, ‘true’ concurrences 
are introduced with the phrase ‘Justice X, concurring in the 
judgment,’ while ‘two-cents’ concurrences are introduced with the 
phrase, ‘Justice X, concurring.’”74  Moreover, “[i]n recent years, it 
has been increasingly common for Justices who join in the majority 
outcome to write separately to explain their agreement with 
discrete portions of the majority rationale and their disagreement 
with others.”75  Indeed, “[o]pinions of this sort,” in the Supreme 
Court, “are now introduced with the phrase, ‘Justice X, concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment.’”76  Professors Kornhauser 
and Sager argue that all appellate courts—consistent with their 
function as “‘collegial enterprises’”—should “directly confront the 
doctrinal paradox” of separate concurring opinions and “deliberately 
determine the method of case decision that will control.”77  They 
conclude “that the best method for choosing between decisional 
methods is” a so-called “‘metavote’” whereby the members of an 
appellate court would “vot[e] for a particular method after 
discussing such factors as whether the outcome or rationales for it 
are more important, whether the issues to be decided are 
independent, the seriousness of the consequences of the outcome, 
hierarchical management concerns, and internal management 
considerations.”78
III.  TEN WAYS TO LOOK AT THE CONCURRING OPINIONS OF JUDGE 
73 Id. at 8 n.14. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1. 
78 Id. 
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RICHARD A. POSNER 
A.  Statistics 
During his first twenty-five years as a United States Court of 
Appeals Judge—measured from his starting date during the fall of 
198179 until the end of 2006 (technically, a bit longer than twenty-
five years)—Judge Richard A. Posner wrote a total of 2,272 
published opinions, or an average of about ninety-one opinions per 
year.80
The distribution of Judge Posner’s fifty-four pure concurring 
79 See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684. 
80 Of these 2,272 opinions, Judge Posner wrote 2,122 opinions for the Seventh Circuit 
majority.  Posner authored a total of 150 published separate opinions during this timeframe; 
these separate opinions consisted of eighty-three dissenting opinions, fifty-four pure 
concurring opinions, and thirteen mixed concurring/dissenting opinions.  My research 
assistant and I calculated these figures based on a hand count of all published authored 
opinions by Judge Posner on the Westlaw federal court Seventh Circuit database of published 
opinions.  The following table summarizes this information. 
 
Year Majority Concurrence Concurrence/Dissent Dissent Total 
1981 3 0 0 0 3 
1982 77 2 0 6 85 
1983 81 7 3 5 96 
1984 77 4 1 5 87 
1985 88 6 0 9 103 
1986 78 3 1 4 86 
1987 79 4 0 2 85 
1988 72 3 2 3 80 
1989 72 3 0 3 78 
1990 86 3 0 5 94 
1991 73 1 1 4 79 
1992 77 1 0 6 84 
1993 98 0 0 3 101 
1994 100 2 0 1 103 
1995 89 2 1 2 94 
1996 103 0 0 2 105 
1997 88 0 1 0 89 
1998 83 1 0 2 86 
1999 90 2 0 5 98 
2000 80 1 1 2 84 
2001 85 2 1 1 88 
2002 89 1 1 3 94 
2003 79 2 0 5 86 
2004 102 2 0 0 104 
2005 75 1 0 1 77 
2006 98 1 0 4 103 
Total 2,122 54 13 83 2,272 
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opinions over these twenty-five years is illuminating.  From late 
1981 through the end of 1986, he wrote twenty-two concurring 
opinions (40.7% of his career concurring opinions); from 1987 
through the end of 1991, he wrote fourteen concurring opinions 
(25.9% of his career concurring opinions); from 1992 through the 
end of 1996, he wrote five concurring opinions (9.3% of his career 
concurring opinions); from 1997 through the end of 2001, he 
authored six concurring opinions (11.1% of his career concurring 
opinions); and from 2002 through the end of 2006, he wrote seven 
concurring opinions (13.0% of his career concurring opinions).81  
Thus—consistent with my findings regarding the frequency of his 
dissenting opinions82—as Judge Posner’s tenure on the bench 
lengthened, he tended to write fewer concurring opinions (with an 
interesting uptick of concurrences during his most recent period as 
an appellate judge).  A possible reason for Posner’s generally 
decreasing rate and number of concurring opinions is his heightened 
satisfaction with Seventh Circuit opinions.  “Posner’s increased 
satisfaction, in turn, is probably related to both his own 
persuasiveness in convincing his colleagues to adopt his reasoning 
on assorted legal issues and to the appointment of more like-minded 
judges to the Seventh Circuit (as well as the Supreme Court).”83  
Other possible reasons for Posner’s decreasing rate of concurring 
opinions are Posner’s judicial maturation over time, his intermittent 
role as Chief Judge, and his ambition for appointment to the 
Supreme Court. 
B.  Different Ways to Look at Posner’s Concurrences 
Splitting a subject into multiple perspectives—or ways of 
looking—can yield interesting insights.  Indeed, two women writing 
in separate fields—Jane Smiley in literary criticism and Gretchen 
Rubin84 in political biography—provide inspiration for those of us 
81 See id.  My statistics do not reflect the type of pure concurring opinions written by Judge 
Posner.  However, in the discussion that follows I do make analytical distinctions of what 
kinds of concurring judicial opinions Judge Posner wrote.  See infra notes 84–399 and 
accompanying text. 
82 See Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style, supra note 4, at 94 (discussing the finding that the 
frequency of Judge Posner’s dissenting opinions decrease corresponding to his judicial 
tenure). 
83 Id. (providing a similar observation to account for the decreased rate of Posnerian 
dissenting opinions over his judicial career). 
84 Rubin has a stellar legal background.  She received her undergraduate and law degrees 
from Yale and was editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal.  She clerked for Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court and served as counsel to the Federal 
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writing in the discipline of law.  Smiley, in her book Thirteen Ways 
of Looking at the Novel,85 crafted an intimate writerly series of 
meditations on the many facets of novels and novel-writing.  Among 
the assorted ways of thinking about her subject, Smiley considered 
“what is a novel”; “who is a novelist”; “the origins of the novel”; “the 
psychology of the novel”; “morality and the novel”; and “reading a 
hundred novels.”86
Rubin, in Forty Ways to Look at Winston Churchill, provides a 
fascinating rationale for her fragmented glimpses of the long life of 
the famous British statesman, author, and adventure-seeker.87  
Rubin explained: 
 As I plunged into his life, a truth (often noted, often 
overlooked) confronted me: Churchill’s portrait could be 
drawn in innumerable ways, all “true.”  I was struck to see 
his biographers reach different conclusions from the same 
facts.  Was Churchill a military genius or a meddling 
amateur?  Was he a great defender of liberty or a reactionary 
imperialist?  Was he a success or a failure?  Once I had 
command of the material, I amused myself by tracing how 
each account exaggerated certain details, and slid over 
others, to support its conclusions.88
Rubin’s observation that facts are subject to “multiple 
interpretations and characterizations”89 is edifying and provocative.  
Moreover, her description of the artistic tradition of a “multi-angle 
approach”90 is fascinating: 
 There’s a long tradition of reexamining the same subject 
in multiple ways: the four Gospels, Bach’s Goldberg 
Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt.  She taught at Yale Law School and 
Yale School of Management.  For a further discussion and analysis of Rubin’s work, see 
http://www.gretchenrubin.com/about/about.html. 
85 JANE SMILEY, THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT THE NOVEL (2005). 
86 Id. at vii (capitalization omitted) (chapter headings in table of contents).  As she explains 
in her introduction, in the wake of 9/11, she had difficulty continuing her twenty-year career 
as a novelist so she decided to re-energize her work by reading one hundred novels to gain 
fresh perspectives on her craft as a fiction writer.  See id. at 3–13.  Smiley’s synopses (of what 
turned out to be 101 novels) range from the ancient Japanese novel, MURASAKI SHIKIBU, THE 
TALE OF GENJI (Kencho Suematsu trans., Tuttle Books 2000) (1004)—about a well-born 
woman describing tales of relationships between the sexes—and the twenty-first century 
novel, IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT (2001)—about three pivotal days in an extended English 
family’s life over the course of several decades of the twentieth century. 
87 GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY WAYS TO LOOK AT WINSTON CHURCHILL: A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF 
A LONG LIFE (2003). 
88 Id. at 3–4. 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 Id. at 9. 
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Variations, Wallace Steven’s “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a 
Blackbird,” Kurosawa’s Rashomon, and Monet’s Haystack 
and Rouen Cathedral series all demonstrate the subtleties 
that emerge when a single subject is viewed under different 
lights.91
In her second biography, Forty Ways to Look at JFK, Gretchen 
Rubin provides another multi-angle approach to examining the 
numerous accounts of the short life of John F. Kennedy.92  I was 
captivated by her amplification of her meta-biographical technique 
and her explanation of one of the key inspirations for her approach.  
As Rubin explains in her introduction to the book: 
 I was struck by Virginia Woolf’s diary entry of November 
28, 1928, in which she described her ambition for The Waves: 
“I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity. . . . 
[sic]  Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that 
don’t belong to the moment; this appalling narrative 
business of the realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is 
false, unreal, merely conventional.”  That’s what I wanted to 
accomplish: to eliminate as much as possible, to clarify what 
I thought important.  I wanted a way both to sweep in trifles 
and to slice through the thicket of facts to make sense of 
what’s known.  Instead of selecting a single viewpoint—as 
almost all biographers do—I wanted a structure that would 
encompass multiple conclusions and would reveal the 
biographer’s machinations to readers.93
The Smiley-Rubin kaleidoscopic technique is suitable for the task 
of commenting on the concurring opinion style of Judge Richard A. 
Posner for three reasons.  First, this approach allows legal observers 
to see functional patterns in the relatively rare concurring 
91 Id. at 8–9.  Among the differing ways of looking at Churchill, Rubin discusses the 
following: “Churchill’s genius with words: his greatest strength”; “Churchill’s desire for fame: 
his motive”; “Churchill’s disdain: his dominant quality”; “Churchill’s belligerence: his defining 
characteristic”; “Churchill the painter: his favorite pastime”; “Churchill the spendthrift: a 
weakness”; “Churchill’s empire: how he saw the world”; “Churchill’s imagination: how he saw 
history”; and “Churchill and Hitler: nemesis.”  Id. at ix–x (capitalization and italics omitted 
except for proper nouns) (chapter headings in table of contents). 
92 GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY WAYS TO LOOK AT JFK (2005). 
93 Id. at 6.  Among the differing ways of looking at JFK, Rubin discusses the following: 
“Kennedy’s excellence: his most outstanding quality”; “Kennedy the fox: his nature”; 
“Kennedy’s mystique: what made him interesting”; “Kennedy’s high ideals: what he 
represented”; “Kennedy’s cool: a secret of his appeal”; “Kennedy as muse: what he inspired”; 
and “who killed John F. Kennedy?  The mystery of his assassination.”  Id. at xi–xii 
(capitalization and italics omitted except for proper nouns) (chapter headings in table of 
contents). 
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performances that Posner chooses to stage.  Second, this technique 
permits us a way to compare and contrast Posner’s concurring 
opinion style with his dissenting opinion style, as well as his 
majority opinion style.  Third, this method will allow future scholars 
to compare Posnerian concurring style with the concurring style of 
other appellate judges. 
What follows, then, consists of ten ways to look at the concurring 
style of Judge Richard A. Posner: (1) as a congressional adviser, (2) 
as an advocate of law and economics, (3) as an institutional critic, 
(4) as a nitpicker, (5) as a weaver of hypotheticals, (6) as a bold 
cutter of Gordian knots, (7) as an interpreter of statutes, (8) as a 
critic of judicial standards of review, (9) as a frank commentator on 
law, and (10) as a show-off during en banc appellate proceedings. 
1.  Posner as Congressional Adviser: Reflections of His Far-
Reaching Intellect and Energy 
Two of Judge Posner’s most distinctive and winning 
characteristics are his extraordinary intellect and energy.  One 
manifestation of these personal qualities is his breathtaking, extra-
judicial publication rate of fifty books and over four hundred law 
review and academic articles.94  Another manifestation of this 
intellectual dynamism is the number and rate of his judicial opinion 
production.95  Yet another materialization of this mental 
vivaciousness is the phenomenon of Posner’s memos to Congress 
contained in several concurring judicial opinions.  Judge Posner’s 
1982 concurring opinion in United States v. Franzen was his first 
example of this type of concurrence.96  Posner “th[ought] it 
unfortunate as a matter of fundamental principle” that the 
appellate panel was constrained “to reverse the dismissal of the 
petition for habeas corpus in this case” and wrote his concurring 
opinion “to explain why [he thought] it unfortunate, in the hope that 
Congress will consider reforms in the habeas corpus statute.”97  
Opining that if the court “were writing on a clean slate,” he would 
94 See Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 161 n.1.  For a complete list of 
his publications, see Publications, Presentations and Works in Progress, University of 
Chicago Law School, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ppw.html. (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Publications]. 
95 See Blomquist, Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684–89, 733; see also Blomquist, 
Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 162–64 (continuing a statistical overview of Judge 
Posner’s work). 
96 676 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring). 
97 Id. 
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be inclined to declare that the petitioner Jones would be ineligible 
under federal constitutional and statutory law to reopen his 
criminal case, tried in Illinois state court, involving murders 
performed by state prison inmates during the course of a prison riot 
that occurred in 1965.98  Posner was of this view because: 
It is an affront to the principles both of federalism and of 
rational criminal procedure for a single federal district judge 
to reexamine fact findings fairly made by a state trial court 
and affirmed with full opinion by the state’s highest court.  It 
undermines the responsibility and morale of state judges, 
denies reasonable finality to criminal proceedings and 
thereby undermines the legitimacy of the criminal-justice 
system, imposes unduly on the time of our busy district 
judges, arouses false hopes in state prisoners, and probably 
does not increase the overall accuracy of constitutional 
determinations.99
But, bowing to reality, Posner acknowledged in Franzen that it 
was not the case that the Seventh Circuit was writing on a clean 
slate since a 1966 federal statute,100 enacted in response to a 1963 
Supreme Court decision,101 dictated the result in the present 
case.102  Cleverly, Posner went on to point out that the 
jurisprudential insistence on an expansive right of habeas corpus 
review for state prisoners was “a product of its time”103—the 
Warren Courts’ aggressive constitutionalization of state criminal 
procedure coupled with “widespread skepticism” concerning the 
willingness of southern states to protect the civil rights of blacks.104  
Moreover, according to Posner’s concurring opinion, “[t]imes have 
changed” and more recent Supreme Court opinions had hinted at a 
weakening of expansive federal habeas corpus entitlements for state 
prisoners.105  As Posner saw it, Congress gave no indication in 
passing 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) that it wanted old Supreme Court 
precedent on federal habeas corpus rights of state prisoners to be 
frozen in time—forestalling evolving judicial reform—“but the effect 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 268 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus 
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1962–1963)). 
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000). 
101 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 
1 (1992). 
102 Franzen, 676 F.2d at 268. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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of the statute has been to preserve as if in amber the outmoded 
jurisprudence” of the Warren Court.106  In closing his concurrence, 
Posner made the following suggestion to Congress: 
 If I am correct that the statute has, through inadvertence, 
come to have an effect different from the one it was intended 
to have, then it would seem to follow that Congress should 
reexamine the statute; specifically, that it should consider 
amending it to provide that federal courts in habeas corpus 
proceedings may not reexamine state-court factfindings 
based, as in the present case, on a full and fair evidentiary 
hearing.107
In rapid succession, Judge Posner fired another statutory flare to 
Congress in his concurrence in Trecker v. Scag—a 1982 securities 
fraud case implicating federal securities law.108  Posner wryly 
asserts the reason for his separate concurrence from the majority 
opinion which he joins “without reservations”; he “write[s] 
separately only to express [his] doubts whether this case really 
belongs in the federal courts.”109  As he puts it: “I do not mean that 
we do not have jurisdiction; I mean that perhaps we should not have 
jurisdiction.”110  Posner’s beef is that such a “local,” small potatoes 
case—involving a Wisconsin closely held corporation with all of the 
disputants save one being Wisconsin residents—should not be 
taking up the valuable time and resources of United States judges; 
he implies during the course of his analysis that Congress might 
want to think seriously about tightening up on the jurisdictional 
provisions of the federal securities statute to exclude these localized 
disputes.111  First, he opined that: “If I thought Congress really 
wanted the federal courts to decide lawsuits of this sort, involving 
primarily local law applied to local disputes between local residents, 
106 Id. at 269–70. 
107 Id. at 270.  In Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) 
(Posner, J., concurring), Judge Posner wrote another opinion suggesting that Congress reform 
federal habeas corpus procedures for state prisoners.  At the outset of his concurrence he 
observed: 
 I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case; separate opinions are the bane of 
the modern American judiciary.  But the case so vividly illustrates the tenuous character 
of the modern law of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, and so urgently 
underscores the need for a fresh approach to the entire subject, that I cannot resist 
commenting . . . .  
Id. 
108 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
2008] Concurrence, Posner-Style 59 
 
I would bow to its desire without protest, for there is no 
constitutional obstacle to federal jurisdiction.”112  But his take on 
the expansive trend of administrative rulemaking and Supreme 
Court precedent since Congress passed the original securities 
legislation is that federal jurisdiction has mushroomed to 
encompass “a garden-variety squabble among shareholders in a 
closely held corporation” with no interstate impact.113  Second, 
Posner pointed out that Rule 10b–5 “was defensible as a catch-all 
prohibition of deceptive devices when the enforcement of the rule 
was confined to the SEC” because of practical budget constraints 
that prevented the agency “from [enforcing] anything like all the 
cases that are within the potential reach of the statutes and rules 
that it enforces”; but private parties have a different set of 
incentives that tend to induce litigation “so long as the expected 
damages exceed, however slightly, the expected cost of the litigation 
to the plaintiff.”114  Third, Posner noted that because of stare decisis 
“we have and cannot renounce jurisdiction in this case, even though 
our jurisdiction is the unintended result of administrative and 
judicial actions that have pushed the federal courts into an area 
that a proper conception of federalism would assign to state 
legislatures and judges.”115  Finally, Posner recalled plaintiff’s 
counsel’s comment during oral argument that he had not brought 
the Trecker suit in state court because “there were no cases under 
Wisconsin’s counterpart to Rule 10b–5—all the case development 
had been federal.”116  Posner’s response to counsel’s candor was an 
implicit differentiation between the expansive text of the New Deal 
era federal securities statute, on the one hand, and what he viewed 
as the narrower congressional intent behind the legislation: “This is 
not what Congress intended to happen,” he said, “when it enacted 
section 10(b) in 1934; I regret that we cannot enforce its actual 
intentions.”117
In a 1989 criminal case involving the murder of a teenage girl and 
the subsequent conspiracy to kill a government witness (also a 
teenage girl), United States v. D’Antoni, Judge Posner wrote a 
concurring opinion to point out a flaw in the federal maximum 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 711. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 712. 
117 Id. 
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sentencing statute for conspiracy.118  According to Posner, the 
statute at bar—18 U.S.C. section 371—“makes no sense.”119  The 
basic flaw was congressional inadvertence in failing to provide for a 
maximum sentence for conspiracy to kill a federal witness, coupled 
with an unrealistic maximum sentence of five-years incarceration 
for any criminal conspiracy—no matter how heinous.120  In light of a 
number of cognate federal criminal statutes which provide 
maximum sentences of ten years or more for various conspiracies 
(such as a conspiracy to deprive a person of his civil rights, 
conspiracy to destroy a vessel, and conspiracy to defraud the 
government), “[t]here is no reason for such a low ceiling” for 
conspiracy to murder a child witness in a drug prosecution.121  
Judge Posner went on to explain that such a criminal sentencing 
anomaly “contributes to the randomness of federal criminal 
punishment.”122  By way of dramatic anecdote, Posner pointed out: 
“The same day we heard argument in this case we heard argument 
in a case where the defendant had received a fifty-year sentence for 
a relatively minor drug offense.”123  In specific advice to Congress, 
Posner opines: 
 Congress should revise section 371 so that its maximum 
penalty depends on the crime the defendants conspired to 
commit.  (At the same time it might wish to address another 
striking deficiency in the federal criminal code—the absence 
of a general attempt statute.)  One way to do this would be to 
make the maximum penalty for the conspiracy equal to the 
maximum for the underlying crime, with perhaps a cap of 
twenty years when the underlying crime is punishable by a 
longer sentence, provided the conspiracy fails.  There is an 
argument for punishing successful conspiracies more severely 
than crimes committed without conspiracy, on the ground 
that a conspiracy is more dangerous than an individual 
criminal.124
In closing his criminal sentencing memorandum to Congress, 
Posner observed: “The precise method of implementing the reform is 
not important.  The principle that criminal sentences should be 
118 874 F.2d 1214, 1221 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring). 
119 Id. 
120 See id. at 1222. 
121 Id. at 1221–22 (citing various maximum-sentence provisions in the federal statutes). 
122 Id. at 1222. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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related to the gravity of the criminal conduct is, and deserves 
Congress’s attention.  Inadequate punishment can work a 
miscarriage of justice, just as excessive punishment can.”125
In 1990, Judge Posner offered advice to Congress to resolve a 
federal securities fraud statute of limitations problem in his 
concurring opinion in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co.126  
Posner didn’t like to have to borrow a statute of repose from another 
federal securities statute to deal with the absence of an appropriate 
limitations period for 10b–5 suits.127  In colorful language, he 
complained that “[b]orrowing a period of limitations from one 
statute to use with another that doesn’t have its own limitations 
provision is a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square 
hole.”128  In particular, in Posner’s analysis: “It artificially truncates 
the court’s choice of an appropriate period, one well suited to the 
particular statute under consideration.  It also runs the risk of 
applying one unprincipled legislative deal to a problem entirely 
outside the scope of the deal.”129  He offers an apt illustration of his 
concerns: 
Suppose Statute A specifies no period of limitations.  Statute 
B regulates analogous conduct, and has a six-month period.  
But maybe B has such a short deadline for suit only because 
the interest group that opposed the enactment of B had 
enough muscle to block a longer deadline that would have 
made more sense from a neutral standpoint.  In that event, 
to borrow B’s limitations period for use with A will project 
the interest-group pressures that deformed B into a 
completely new area of conduct. 
 Whether or not courts are aware of this danger, they do 
attempt to correct for it by considering, as part of the 
borrowing procedure, the suitability to the substantive rule 
under consideration of the limitations periods in the various 
candidate statutes of limitations.  But this places a lot of 
balls in the air.  The considerations bearing on the suitability 
of one limitations period compared to another include the 
difficulty of investigating potential violations, the possibility 
that the consequences of wrongdoing will be delayed, the 
125 Id. 
126 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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opportunities for wrongdoers to conceal the wrong, the rate 
at which evidence of wrongdoing and also evidence pertinent 
to the alleged wrongdoer’s defense is likely to decay, the 
sophistication of the relevant tribunals in handling stale 
evidence, the desirability of freeing court time for fresh 
claims, the interest of potential defendants in repose—that 
is, in knowing after a definite period has passed that they no 
longer have to worry about being sued—and the effect on the 
deterrence of statutory violators of reducing the time for 
bringing suit.130
Judge Posner continued his advice to Congress in Short by voicing 
concern about courts applying a “standardless, discretionary 
judgment: a multifactor test with no weights on the factors.”131  
Moreover, he opined that “[s]ince courts cannot be expected to 
converge on a uniform outcome when they are operating under such 
a standard, predicting what statute of limitations will be borrowed 
is impossible and as a result extensive litigation often is necessary 
before a definitive conclusion on the limitations period emerges.”132  
Posner raised, but then rejected, the idea of courts to candidly 
“create statutes of limitations for claims that lack them”;133 the 
problem with this approach is the disparity that would exist in 
lower court decisions on appropriate limitation periods.134  Judge 
Posner suggests that an “institutional solution is necessary” with 
two possible approaches.135
“One . . . would be for Congress to adopt a rule that every statute 
shall contain a statute of limitations.”136  To enforce such a rule 
would require a congressional agency to canvass new federal 
statutory enactments and point out statutes which lack 
congressional limitations periods or, alternatively, to adopt a rule of 
interpretation whereby “if a statute contains no period of 
limitations, there . . . is no deadline on suing.”137
130 Id. at 1393–94. 
131 Id. at 1394. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1394–95. 
137 Id. at 1395 (citation omitted).  Posner notes in this regard: 
This would cause considerable havoc but could be mitigated by a rule (well within the 
power of judges to create, I believe) that, in the absence of a statutory limitations period, 
the courts will apply the equitable doctrine of laches even if the cause of action is legal 
rather than equitable.  Then the defendant could defend by showing that the plaintiff 
had unreasonably delayed in bringing the suit and that the defendant had been hurt by 
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A second potential way for creating uniform limitation periods for 
federal statutes which lack such periods “would be for Congress to 
delegate to the Judicial Conference of the United States, or to some 
new agency modeled on the Sentencing Commission . . . the power 
to adopt by regulation a period of limitations for any statute that 
does not have one.”138  According to Judge Posner, “[t]his would lift 
the burden from Congress of having to specify a limitations period 
in every enactment and would shift it to an expert body that could 
avoid the delay of litigation.  It would be a great improvement over 
borrowing.”139
Another prominent example of Judge Posner deploying a 
concurring judicial opinion as a policy memorandum to Congress is 
his concurrence in the 2003 immigration dispute, Oforji v. 
Ashcroft.140  Indeed, at the outset of his concurring opinion, Posner 
joins the majority opinion “in the main, though we interpret some of 
the facts in this confusing record differently.”141  Posner “write[s] 
separately not to quibble over these differences but to invite 
congressional attention to a pair of anomalies in the immigration 
laws.”142  The first rule that he suggests Congress needs to 
reconsider is the flat ten-year period for an alien living in the 
United States to plead hardship to her children (born in the United 
States and, therefore, American citizens) as a basis for suspension 
of the parent’s deportation proceeding.143  Judge Posner’s rationale 
on this point is as follows: 
 [The ten-year] rule has only a tenuous relation to the 
hardship of children whose parent is ordered deported.  What 
is true is that the longer the children have lived in the 
United States, the greater the hardship to them of being sent 
back to their parent’s native country—one of the 
unappetizing choices facing these children and a choice made 
more excruciating the longer they remain here and become 
acclimated to American ways.  But the length of time a child 
has lived in the United States depends on when she was born 
as well as on when her parents came to the United States.  
the delay. 
Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 354 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 620. 
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The parent may have been here for ten years but the child 
[may] have been born six months ago; or the parent may 
have been here for nine years but the child [may] have been 
born eight years ago.  The [ten-year- flat period] rule is 
irrational [when] viewed as a device for identifying those 
cases in which the hardship to an alien’s children should 
weigh against forcing her to leave the country.144
A second immigration rule which Posner suggests Congress 
should rethink is the absolute “awarding of citizenship to everyone 
born in the United States,” with a few exceptions for cases involving 
of children of foreign officials.145  Although potentially anchored in 
the language of “section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Judge 
Posner believes that the real problem is a statutory one since Title 8 
of the United States Code dictates the automatic citizenship 
approach for all children born in America—regardless of the 
circumstances.146  Posner is concerned about abuses that such a 
bright line rule fosters—such as the tens of thousands of babies 
born in the United States every year to “illegal immigrants and 
others who come here to give birth so their children will be 
American citizens.”147  According to his reasoning, “[w]e should not 
be encouraging foreigners to come to the United States solely to 
enable them to confer U.S. citizenship on their future children.”148
2.  Posner as Advocate of Law and Economics: His Leitmotif 
A recurrent theme running through the scholarly and judicial 
work product of Richard A. Posner is his discussion of economic 
principles applied to the myriad of problems in the law.  Indeed, 
Posner is viewed by many as the founder of the Field of Law and 
Economics.  So it is not surprising that Judge Posner has chosen to 
utilize his concurring and majority opinions as occasions for 
emphasizing how (in his view) economics can clarify and elucidate 
the best way to resolve legal issues.  Early in his tenure on the 
federal appellate bench, Posner offered numerous Law and 
Economics concurring opinions.  For example, in the 1983 case of 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Chicago Area v. Kempiners, Posner 
joined the per curiam opinion which vacated the district court’s 
144 Id. (emphasis added). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 620–21 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000)). 
147 Id. at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
148 Id. 
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ruling in favor of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim for the taking of 
additional evidence on the issue of standing; he wrote separately to 
examine Planned Parenthood’s economic stake in the litigation.149  
The Illinois statute at issue “creates a program for state funding of 
organizations that offer assistance in problem pregnancies, provided 
the organization does not refer or counsel for abortion.”150  The nub 
of Judge Posner’s concurrence addressed the probability of Planned 
Parenthood receiving money from the state program: 
Planned Parenthood has standing to challenge [the 
statutory] proviso if there is a reasonable probability that 
striking it down would result in a tangible benefit to Planned 
Parenthood: namely, receiving money under the program.  I 
do not think Planned Parenthood has to show that it will be 
certain to receive money if the proviso is struck down; but if 
that is only a remote possibility, Planned Parenthood’s 
tangible stake in the outcome of this lawsuit is too slight to 
give it standing.151
Unfortunately, the remainder of his concurring opinion is 
rambling and incomprehensible on the issue of standing because of 
the speculative and incoherent musings that Judge Posner indulges 
in for the purpose of guessing why the plaintiff delayed in applying 
for a state grant.152  Posner’s concurring opinion in another 1983 
case, St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,153 also falls 
short of providing economic analysis which illuminates the federal 
income tax issues at bar.  Instead, Posner’s riffs on “the economics 
of the family” and the ways that “[a] housewife contributes to the 
wealth of the family by freeing up, for the production of additional 
market income, time that the husband would otherwise have to 
devote to household work,” come across as more exhibitionist and 
extravagant than analytically useful.154
149 700 F.2d 1115, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curium) (Posner, J., writing separately). 
150 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111 ½, §§ 4601–
100 (current version at Problem Pregnancy Health Services and Care Act, 410 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 230/4–102 (West 2007))). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1136–37. 
153 716 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
154 Id. at 1187.  For another example of an extravagant, turgid “Law and Economics” 
analysis, see Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
If such [sexual] harassment is rampant, the city will have to pay higher wages to attract 
female employees.  It is unlikely to reap an offsetting gain in lower wages for male 
employees who obtain along with their jobs a license as it were to harass female workers.  
Many, perhaps most, men don’t want such a license; and among those who do, still most 
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In contradistinction, Judge Posner’s Law and Economics analysis 
concurrence of why it made sense to award costs to the government 
defendants in an unfounded lawsuit brought by neighbors who were 
upset about a Department of Housing and Urban Development 
property which had become vacant and allegedly derelict, was 
forceful and compelling.155  As eloquently expressed by Posner: 
 [A] factor that the plaintiffs ask us to consider is whether, 
if they had won the case, it would have been a “landmark” 
decision; they argue that the efforts of litigants who press for 
fundamental changes in the law should be subsidized, lest 
the high risk of losing deter such litigants.  I question the 
validity of this argument in today’s legal climate.  The 
federal courts are choking with litigation, much of it 
completely meritless; fear of losing seems not to be much of a 
deterrent.  And to reward the loser of what would have been 
a landmark case if he had won creates the following paradox: 
the more frivolous the suit, the greater the landmark it 
would establish in the unlikely event that it succeeded, and 
hence the stronger the argument for denying the winner his 
costs.  A successful suit to overrule Brown v. Board of 
Education and thus make racial segregation in public schools 
once again lawful, would be one of the all-time legal 
landmarks.  No one takes the landmark argument for 
forgiving the loser’s costs that seriously; no one argues for 
interpreting Rule 54(d) to encourage the bringing of lawsuits 
that have no reasonable chance of succeeding, merely 
because if they did succeed they would work a legal 
revolution.  The present lawsuit had no reasonable chance of 
succeeding, and in fact borders on the frivolous.156
The above-mentioned quotation from Posner’s Burroughs 
concurrence is winning because it is cast in terms that everyone can 
understand and it utilizes an example that powerfully illustrates 
the operation of the economic principles involved in deciding 
whether or not to award costs against the losing plaintiff.  Another 
example of a practical take on economic issues is found in Judge 
Posner’s concurring opinion in Jones v. Miller;157 in that 
don’t value it as much as women disvalue being harassed.  More important, the 
productivity of both male and female employees must suffer if harassment is common. 
Id. at 1192. 
155 Burroughs v. Hills, 741 F.2d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring). 
156 Id. at 1538 (citation omitted). 
157 768 F.2d 923, 930 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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concurrence, Posner gives commonsense advice to district judges for 
issuing opinions in bankruptcy cases by suggesting that the busy 
judges decide cases by tentative oral opinions, followed by a review 
of the transcript for necessary polishing, citations, and 
amplification.158
Judge Posner’s 1987 concurring opinion in Chicago Board of 
Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago is valuable because it explains, 
through straightforward economic analysis, how the ostensible 
“health, safety, and welfare” purposes for the regulation of 
residential leases are disingenuous at best and a sham at worse.159  
Posner explains that by “requir[ing] the payment of interest on 
security deposits; requir[ing] that those deposits be held in Illinois 
bank;” allowing tenants to withhold rent for some reasons; 
permitting tenants “to make minor repairs and subtract the 
reasonable cost of the repair from their rent;” and regulating the 
late charges landlords can charge tenants, among other changes, 
the City of Chicago’s new residential lease ordinance will have the 
perverse effect of undermining the quantity and quality of the 
housing stock available to renters.160  As Posner put it, “[f]orbidding 
landlords to charge interest at market rates on late payment of rent 
could hardly be thought [of as] calculated to improve the health, 
safety, and welfare of Chicagoans” and, indeed, “may have the 
opposite effect.”161  The likely consequences of this part of the 
ordinance are easy to envision in the simply stated language 
deployed by Judge Posner: 
The initial consequences of the rule will be to reduce the 
resources that landlords devote to improving the quality of 
housing, by making the provision of rental housing more 
costly.  Landlords will try to offset the higher cost (in time 
value of money, less predictable cash flow, and, probably, 
higher rate of default) by raising rents.  To the extent they 
succeed, tenants will be worse off, or at least no better off.  
Landlords will also screen applicants more carefully, because 
the cost of renting to a deadbeat will now be higher; so 
marginal tenants will find it harder to persuade landlords to 
rent to them.  Those who do find apartments but then are 
slow to pay will be subsidized by responsible tenants . . . who 
158 Id. at 932. 
159 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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will be paying higher rents, assuming the landlord cannot 
determine in advance who is likely to pay rent on time.  
Insofar as these efforts to offset the ordinance fail, the cost of 
rental housing will be higher to landlords and therefore less 
will be supplied—more of the existing stock than would 
otherwise be the case will be converted to condominia and 
cooperatives and less rental housing will be built.162
Judge Posner should have quit his economic analysis of the 
Chicago rental ordinance while he was ahead.  After all, he was 
concurring with the majority opinion which had affirmed the 
district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Chicago 
landlords because the ordinance did not violate any federal 
constitutional standard.163  Judge Posner’s extended economic 
diatribe (with a parade of economic horribles surmised without 
substantial economic evidence) goes over the line of reasonable 
concurrence and takes on the form of an ideological libertarian 
manifesto.164
In his concurring opinion in the 1990 case, United States v. 
McKinney,165 Judge Posner offered some pithy observations on “the 
standard for reviewing determinations of probable cause” in 
criminal cases by lower court judges.166  In the first place, he 
likened a judicial probable cause determination in a criminal 
proceeding to a “finding of negligence in an ordinary tort suit,” 
concluding that both types of judicial findings involve “the 
application of the legal standard to the facts of the particular 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 734–37, 740–41 (majority opinion). 
164 The following economic analysis in Judge Posner’s concurring opinion is unpersuasive 
because it is not rooted in reasonable inferences but sounds arrogant and ideological: 
 The ordinance is not in the interest of poor people.  As is frequently the case with 
legislation ostensibly designed to promote the welfare of the poor, the principal 
beneficiaries will be middle-class people.  They will be people who buy rather than rent 
housing (the conversion of rental to owner housing will reduce the price of the latter by 
increasing its supply); people willing to pay a higher rental for better-quality housing; 
and (a largely overlapping group) more affluent tenants, who will become more attractive 
to landlords because such tenants are less likely to be late with the rent or to abuse the 
right of withholding rent—a right that is more attractive, the poorer the tenant.  The 
losers from the ordinance will be some landlords, some out-of-state banks, the poorest 
class of tenants, and future tenants.  The landlords are few in number (once owner-
occupied rental housing is excluded—and the ordinance excludes it).  Out-of-staters can’t 
vote in Chicago elections.  Poor people in our society don’t vote as often as the affluent. 
Id. at 742 (Posner, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
165 919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), abrogated by United States v. 
Spears, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992). 
166 Id. 
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case.”167  In Posner’s view, “appellate review of the application of 
law to fact should be deferential.”168  In the second place, he 
employed forceful Law and Economics methodology to show how a 
lower court finding of probable cause and a lower court finding of 
negligence are bottomed on an identical kind of judgment: 
Both negligence and probable cause require a judgment of 
reasonableness that is made after balancing costs and 
benefits (the costs of care and the benefits of accident 
avoidance in the negligence case, and the costs of getting 
evidence of criminal guilt by other means and the benefits in 
protecting privacy in the probable-cause case) and is based 
explicitly on probabilities (the probability of an accident in 
the negligence case and the probability that a search will 
turn up evidence of crime in the probable-cause case).169
Several years later in his 2001 concurrence in Great Lakes 
Warehouse v. NLRB, Posner utilized economic exegesis to untangle 
some knotty principles of federal labor law.170  He urged the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or a future reviewing court 
“in an appropriate case, which this is not” to amplify and rethink 
the “conventional principle that offering a promotion is one method 
of interfering with a union organizing campaign” and “the equally 
conventional principle that failure to impose discipline uniformly 
can be evidence of discrimination against a union supporter.”171  
Deploying the effective tropes of a “carrot” and a “stick,” Judge 
Posner sought to illuminate the questions.  First, regarding a 
“carrot,” he wrote: 
 The idea that the carrot is as potent as the stick, and 
therefore that it is as “coercive” to offer a union supporter a 
promotion to management as it is to fire him, is unsound.  
Most workers welcome a promotion, and so a company that 
has a practice of promoting union supporters to get them out 
of the bargaining unit, the group of workers that vote on 
whether to unionize the unit, will actually increase the 
expected income of being a union supporter.  The more eager 
the company is to buy off union supporters, the more union 
supporters there will be.  So likely, therefore, is such a tactic 
167 Id. at 419. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 419–20 (citation omitted). 
170 239 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J., concurring). 
171 Id. at 892. 
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of discouraging unionization to backfire that the Board 
should hesitate to infer such a motive from the offer of 
promotion.172
Second, regarding a “stick,” Posner opined: 
 [One of the litigants] received the stick, not the carrot; but 
the use of evidence of nonuniformity in the imposition of 
discipline to support an inference [of] discrimination has a 
downside that, again, [is not adequately] recognize[d].  If a 
company risks legal trouble by exercising lenience in the 
enforcement of its work rules, it will have an incentive to 
enforce those rules in a uniform and therefore harsh manner.  
Lenience will be out.  Workers as a whole may suffer.  It does 
not follow that evidence of discriminatory enforcement 
should be inadmissible, because having strict rules on 
attendance or performance but enforcing them only against 
union supporters would be a potent method of discouraging 
unionization.  But the downside [of] this type of evidence 
that I have pointed to is an argument for the Board’s 
resolving close cases against an inference of 
discrimination.173
Judge Posner also brought a judicious blend of Law and 
Economics perspectives to his 2002 concurring opinion in Schroeder 
v. Hamilton School District, which agreed with the majority that a 
former public school teacher did not present a material issue of fact 
sufficient to avoid a summary judgment in the school’s favor on a 
Section 1983 claim (which alleged that he was denied equal 
protection by the school’s failure to take effective steps to prevent 
him from being harassed on account of his same-sex orientation).174  
Posner chose to write separately in the case to emphasize that the 
result would be the same even if the teacher was able to prove that 
the school administration’s “response to his complaints about the 
harassment to which he was subjected was tepid in comparison to 
[the] response to [the] signs of racial prejudice” at the school.175  He 
highlighted four key economic considerations in his concurrence in 
Schroeder—all of which supported his startling claim that “[t]he 
administration of the public schools of this country in the current 
climate of rancid identity politics, pervasive challenges to authority, 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 282 F.3d 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J., concurring). 
175 Id. 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
2008] Concurrence, Posner-Style 71 
 
and mounting litigiousness is an undertaking at once daunting and 
thankless.”176  First, Judge Posner noted that “it is not irrational to 
prioritize protective activities.  It is in fact unavoidable, because of 
limitations of time and (other) resources.”177  In Posner’s view: “If 
race relations are a particularly sensitive area in a particular 
school, the school authorities are not irrational in deciding to devote 
more time and effort to defusing racial tensions than to preventing 
harassment of a homosexual (or overweight, or undersized, or 
nerdish, or homely) teacher.”178  Second, examining the economics of 
unknown harassment, Posner wrote that “when most of the abuse 
directed at a person is anonymous,” as it was in the case at bar, “the 
school authorities may be unable to prevent it without a 
disproportionate commitment of resources to the effort or a 
disproportionate curtailment of student rights.”179  Third, Judge 
Posner emphasized the logic of school administrator’s “reticence 
about flagging issues of sex for children” based on the following 
legitimate educational concerns: “[I]t is possible for a rational school 
administration to fear that if it explains sexual phenomena, 
including homosexuality, to schoolchildren in an effort to get them 
to understand that it is wrong to abuse homosexuals, it will make 
children prematurely preoccupied with issues of sexuality.”180  
Again, elaborating on a theme of rational cost-benefit calculation for 
school officials, Posner stated a fourth economic consideration that 
supported judicially denying the plaintiff’s legal claim: 
 [I]t is a mistake automatically to equate favoritism to 
discrimination.  The difference is that while discrimination 
against a group harms the group, favoritism for another 
group may not harm the nonfavored group, or may harm it 
too slightly for the law to take notice.  Even if the school 
authorities had no good reason to be as solicitous of the 
welfare of their black and female students as they were, it 
176 Id. at 959. 
177 Id. at 958 (citations omitted). 
178 Id.  Judge Posner added the following additional analysis to this first point: 
 It is true that the out-of-pocket costs of some additional measures that the [school] 
might have taken, for example adding to every memo warning against discrimination on 
grounds of race the words “or sexual orientation,” would have been slight.  But such an 
addition would have a negligible effect without amplification—except perhaps to dilute 
the warning against racial discrimination.  The more amplification, moreover, the greater 
the dilution—which shows that the measure would not have been costless after all. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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would not follow that, had they been less solicitous of them, 
Schroeder would have benefited; and, if not, how was he 
hurt?181
Judge Posner ended his Schroeder concurring opinion with a bold 
bow of political philosophy, managing to tie together his Law and 
Economics reasoning into a well-wrapped conclusion: 
We judges should not make [the administration of the public 
schools] even more daunting [than it already is] by injecting 
our own social and educational values in the name of 
“rationality review”.  So while in hindsight it appears that 
the defendants could have done more to protect Schroeder 
from abuse, it is equally important to emphasize that 
lackluster is not a synonym for invidious or irrational.  There 
is no evidence that the defendants were hostile to Schroeder 
because of his sexual orientation—or because of anything 
else, for that matter.  And they cannot be said to have been 
irrational in failing to do more than they did, as there were 
rational considerations counseling against more vigorous 
action.182
3.  Posner the Institutional Critic: His Concern with Core 
Competencies, Boundaries, and Purposes 
Another way to look at the concurring judicial opinions of Judge 
Richard A. Posner is to consider those concurrences which have 
emphasized institutional considerations.  In this regard, Posner is 
adept at understanding the legal process dimensions of the 
American system of making and applying law in numerous 
instantiations of organizations.183  He has an uncanny ability to 
fathom the appropriate boundaries of judicial intervention and 
management of public policy problems, on the one hand, while 
understanding the proper role of other institutions, on the other 
hand.  An early example of Posner’s use of the concurrence as a 
method of institutional critique is his 1983 concurring opinion in 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 959. 
183 The classic American legal book on the importance of law and institutions is HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).  
For an extended discussion of institutional factors that bear on American legislatures, see 
Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and 
Possibilities, 38 AKRON L. REV. 895 (2005). 
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Gautreaux v. Pierce.184  Judge Posner strongly preferred a different 
theory than the majority opinion,185 which affirmed the district 
court’s factual finding that the so-called Academy Square housing 
project, approved by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), was in the “best interest[] of the community”—
the standard earlier set in the complex litigation by a consent 
decree.186  Posner had a serious problem with the justiciability, 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, of a federal district judge 
passing on the essentially political issue of whether or not a fifteen 
percent ceiling of public housing units in a census tract on the Near 
West Side of Chicago could be exceeded if “HUD shows to the court’s 
satisfaction that the project is in the best interests of the 
community where the assisted housing would be located.”187  
Initially, he pointed out that for a trial judge’s decision “to be 
judicial in character, the standard for decision must be definite 
enough to allow a reasoned judgment, as distinct from a political 
judgment such as a legislative or administrative body might 
make.”188  Next, in a fascinating meditation on the “best interests of 
the community” standard in the consent decree in the case at bar 
compared with other judicial best interest standards, he concluded 
that these other standards were established by Congress (in 
contrast to the consent decree), could be given meaning by the 
context of the statutory language (in contrast to the consent decree), 
and usually focused on a particular individual (in contrast to the 
consent decree specifying a “community” which “is an aggregation of 
individuals having different, and in this case warring, interests”).189  
In a related insight, Posner opined that “[i]f the parties to the 
decree wanted someone to make a best interests of the community 
determination, as evidently they did, they should have appointed an 
arbitrator.”190  At this point in his concurring opinion, Judge Posner 
noted that there were analogous situations when judges would not 
set unspecified terms in an agreement: 
 A court will not enforce an ordinary contract that is 
indefinite—a contract that does not specify a price, for 
184 707 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
185 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text for this reason for writing an appellate 
concurring opinion, among other reasons. 
186 Gautreaux, 707 F.2d at 269 (majority opinion). 
187 Id. at 270 (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 270–71. 
190 Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 183, 
at 306–30 (discussing arbitration). 
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example (unless it appears that the parties meant the price 
to be the market price or some other readily ascertainable 
standard of value). . . . When courts do in effect fix a price—
when they fix the reasonable “price” of life and limb in 
awarding damages in personal-injury cases, for example—
they do so in accordance with objective standards, which are 
lacking here.  If courts will not let contracting parties 
delegate to them the function of setting essential terms of the 
contract, no more should they agree to play city planner just 
because the parties would like them to.191
Posner was not persuaded by the evidence of best interest of the 
community relied upon by the majority opinion (noting “[t]he 
various shards of evidence on which my brethren rely seem to me 
unpersuasive singly and in combination”).192  But, shifting ground, 
he argued that the district court’s order should be affirmed since the 
appellants in the present case lacked standing because they were 
“neither parties to the decree nor third-party beneficiaries” to the 
decree.193  To allow these appellants to challenge the consent decree 
would, in Posner’s colorful turn of phrase, “turn every consent 
decree into a statute.”194  Thus: 
If a seller of bakery products sued a competitor for predatory 
pricing, and they entered into a consent settlement that the 
court approved and embodied in a consent decree forbidding 
the defendant to sell its bakery products below cost, no other 
sellers of bakery products besides the plaintiff could later 
intervene to enforce the consent decree because they thought 
the defendant was hurting them by selling below cost.  The 
consent decree would not be a privately enforceable statute 
limiting the defendant’s pricing freedom; it would be a source 
of enforceable rights only to the plaintiff.  Similarly, the 
lawsuit that the consent decree in this case settled was 
brought by black people complaining of segregated public 
housing, and the decree was for their benefit.  No one else 
has a legally enforceable right to block the project in the 
name of the decree.195
Posner’s institutional critique in his 1982 concurrence in Trecker 
191 Gautreaux, 707 F.2d at 271 (Posner, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
192 Id. at 272. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 273 (citation omitted). 
195 Id. 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
2008] Concurrence, Posner-Style 75 
 
v. Scag196 was premised not on the core competency of federal courts 
in resolving judicial types of disputes, as was his concern in 
Gautreaux,197 but on the institutional purpose that Congress had in 
mind in enacting the federal securities statute in 1934.  In Trecker, 
Posner could not believe that Congress wanted federal courts to 
exercise “federal jurisdiction in a case [which was] a garden-variety 
squabble among shareholders in a closely held corporation, which 
could not even be maintained as a diversity action because of the 
lack of complete diversity among the parties.”198
Judge Posner spoke to the institutional concerns of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in his concurrence in the 1983 en 
banc case of Egger v. Phillips.199  Egger involved a former FBI agent 
who brought suit against his former superior seeking damages 
based on allegations that his transfer from an FBI field office in 
Indianapolis to Chicago and his subsequent discharge for failure to 
report to his new duty station was in violation of his constitutional 
rights.200  Posner agreed that the ex-FBI agent could not sue his 
former supervisor for money damages for institutional reasons: “I 
am not convinced,” he wrote, “that this case should be decided 
differently [from a previous Seventh Circuit decision which 
disallowed a suit for money damages sought by members of an army 
reserve unit for their transfer to another unit]”;201 this was because 
“of the potential disruptive effect of damages liability on the FBI’s 
ability to maintain discipline and cohesion.”202
In his 1984 concurrence in Burroughs v. Hills, Judge Posner 
wrote separately to emphasize the important boundary issue that 
the loser of a federal lawsuit should be responsible for paying 
costs.203  His 1985 concurring opinion in United States v. OCCI Co. 
focused on the institutional nature of HUD’s decision to foreclose on 
a commercial mortgage;204 such a decision, according to Posner, 
should not be subject to judicial review because of the lack of any 
196 679 F.2d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring).  For a discussion of Posner’s 
concurrence in Trecker v. Scag as an example of his concurring opinions providing advice to 
Congress, see supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
198 Trecker, 679 F.2d at 710–11. 
199 710 F.2d 292, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
200 Id. at 294. 
201 Id. at 325. 
202 Id. 
203 741 F.2d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).  For a discussion of 
Posner’s concurrence in Burroughs as an example of Law and Economics reasoning, see supra 
notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
204 758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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meaningful standard to apply and because: 
The decision to foreclose on a commercial mortgage [by HUD] 
rather than give the mortgagor more time, like the decision 
how much rent to charge for an apartment, is a managerial 
and business rather than legal judgment.  It has to be made 
and implemented quickly in order to be effective, and courts 
can do little to improve it . . . .205
Judge Posner’s concurrence in another 1985 case, Gotches v. 
Heckler,206 like his concurring opinion in OCCI,207 focused on 
administrative efficiency and efficacy as worthy institutional 
goals.208  Gotches involved a class action claim of a widow of a 
retired railroad worker who had been receiving both railroad 
retirement and social security benefits prior to his death.209  The 
railroad worker’s widow, through her attorney, sought to effect 
changes in the government’s award of benefits to surviving widows 
in similar cases throughout the country.210  The government delayed 
for about six months in signing a consent decree in the class action 
and the widow’s attorney sought the award of his attorney’s fees 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.211  While Posner agreed with 
the majority opinion—which remanded computation of the attorney 
fees based on a reasonable calculation of the benefits he had 
obtained for Mrs. Gotches but not for his fees in negotiating a 
consent decree which covered generic cases212—he was disturbed by 
“some of its reasoning and about . . . the opinion’s unduly harsh tone 
of criticism of the government.”213  Posner considered the 
institutional dynamics of government review of administrative 
policy change to be a vital government interest which should be 
respected by the judiciary and given a wide berth: 
 When the federal government is confronted by a demand 
to make far-reaching changes in the administration of major 
programs, under the supervision of a federal judge, the 
public interest is disserved if the government simply caves in 
and signs a consent decree drafted by the plaintiffs’ counsel, 
205 Id. at 1167 (emphasis added). 
206 773 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
207 See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
208 Gotches, 773 F.3d at 112–15 (Posner, J., concurring). 
209 Id. at 109–10 (majority opinion). 
210 Id. at 109. 
211 Id. at 109–12 (citing Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)). 
212 Id. at 112. 
213 Id. at 112 (Posner, J., concurring). 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
2008] Concurrence, Posner-Style 77 
 
without careful consideration of the costs, consequences, and 
ramifications.  Government by judicial decree is not yet the 
norm in this country, and a public agency does neither the 
courts nor the taxpaying public a favor when it consents too 
readily to the entry of a far-reaching decree curtailing its 
freedom of action.  It was prudent for the government to take 
several months to consider and negotiate over the plaintiffs’ 
proposals.214
Judge Posner’s 1988 concurring opinion in Archie v. City of 
Racine, an en banc rehearing by the full Seventh Circuit, returned 
his institutional gaze to concerns about the proper “allocation of 
governmental responsibilities between the states and the federal 
government.”215  The case involved a Section 1983 civil rights action 
which arose out of a local fire department dispatcher’s failure to 
provide rescue services as requested by a black woman who died 
shortly thereafter.216  The majority opinion determined that the 
dispatcher had violated no constitutional rights of the deceased 
woman and, therefore, the administrator of her estate and her 
surviving children had no cause of action.217  Posner chose to “write 
separately to propose a slightly different though consistent view of 
the case.”218  At the start of his concurrence Posner sympathized 
with the “victims in these failure-to-rescue cases [who, like the 
decedent in this matter] appear to be drawn disproportionately from 
marginal segments of the community, where the ordinary political 
pressures for effective provision of public reserve services may be 
attenuated.”219  In addition, he conceded that given the 
“plastic . . . language of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, at least when viewed against the ambiguous history of 
the term ‘due process’”; he concluded “that a respectable textual 
argument can be made in favor of the proposition that [the 
dispatcher] deprived [the caller] either of her property or her life 
without due process of law.”220  However, Judge Posner opined that 
he “[n]evertheless . . . agree[d] that the plaintiffs in the present case 
must lose.”221  Thus, in a constitutional sense, even a grossly 
214 Id. at 114 (citation omitted). 
215 847 F.2d 1211, 1224, 1226 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
216 Id. at 1213–14 (majority opinion). 
217 Id. at 1214. 
218 Id. at 1224 (Posner, J., concurring). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1225. 
221 Id. 
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negligent course of action by the dispatcher, under the 
circumstances in the record, did not rise to the level of intentional or 
reckless culpability;222 moreover, Posner was alarmed at the 
potential for federal causes of action to displace state courts in the 
business of adjudicating contract and tort law disputes: 
 The combination of the procedural innovations that have 
in the last quarter century revitalized 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the 
main vehicle for constitutional tort litigation), with the 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment that in the 
same period have vastly expanded the amendment’s 
substantive and procedural limitations upon state action, 
threaten between them to transfer almost the whole of public 
contract law and public-employee tort law from the state 
courts to the federal courts.  Not only are the federal courts 
unprepared for such an influx of litigation, but the 
transference would be inconsistent with a rational allocation 
of governmental responsibilities between the states and the 
federal government.  The Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts have therefore attempted to come up with 
limiting principles, and while the scope of those principles is 
not entirely clear . . . they appear to defeat the effort by the 
plaintiffs in this case to demonstrate either a deprivation of 
property or a deprivation of life.223
As we have seen, Judge Posner’s concurring opinion in United 
States v. McKinney can be primarily appreciated under the rubric of 
his penchant for economic analysis of law.224  Yet, Posner added to 
his hallmark economic approach with an institutional analysis in 
McKinney, noting in this regard “the nature of the issue to be 
reviewed in relation to the comparative institutional advantages of 
trial and reviewing courts, and other pertinent practical 
considerations, rather than the words in which standards of 
appellate review are formulated, should . . . determine the scope of 
review.”225
Judge Posner’s 2001 concurring opinion in Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. is an 
illustration of his turning the light of his exploration of institutional 
222 Id. at 1226. 
223 Id. 
224 See supra Part III.B.2. 
225 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added to the first 
phrase). 
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factors inward on the workings of his own United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals.226  The Seventh Circuit was rehearing the case en 
banc; the gravaman of the dispute was the admissibility and 
relevance of the collective bargaining agreement as it bore on the 
discipline of an employee who had engaged in sexually offensive 
conduct resulting in alleged harassment of women employees.227  
While Posner agreed with the full court that “the panel erred in 
ordering a new trial on liability,” he objected to the en banc review 
of the panel decision.228  He complained: 
But we do not take cases en banc merely because of 
disagreement with a panel’s decision, or rather a piece of a 
decision, least of all a piece of a decision concerning the 
relevance of a particular item of evidence to a particular 
issue in a particular case.  We take cases en banc to answer 
questions of general importance likely to recur, or to resolve 
intracircuit conflicts, or to address issues of transcendent 
public significance—perhaps even to curb a “runaway” 
panel—but not just to review a panel opinion for error, even 
in cases . . . in which sexual harassment is charged.229
Judge Posner noted that “such [en banc] determination is” 
improper because “[t]he questions” regarding the relevance of a 
company’s collective bargaining agreement with a union to a federal 
sexual harassment claim “have not arisen in any other reported 
case, and for all I know may never arise,” and because the trial 
court’s exclusion of the collective bargaining agreement evidence 
was “harmless,” the “grant of rehearing en banc was gratuitous as 
well as premature.”230  He added: 
And it was premature not only in the sense that there was no 
need to answer the questions yet, but also because, as a 
consequence of there being no other cases, we lack an 
adequate basis in experience for answering general questions 
about relevance; we lack sufficient particulars to be able to 
generalize intelligently.231
226 256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
227 Id. at 519 (majority opinion). 
228 Id. at 529 (Posner, J., concurring). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id.  He continued in this vein: 
 It might well be thought foolhardy to lay down a blanket rule, not justified by 
considerations of privilege, that an entire class of evidence is “irrelevant,” and therefore 
inadmissible, in a broad class of cases having, potentially at least, diverse facts, without 
some sense of what those facts might be.  A narrower rule might be unexceptionable. 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
80 Albany Law Review [Vol. 71 
 
4.  Posner as Nitpicker: Two Views 
a.  Posner is a Nitpicker 
To nitpick is to “find fault in a petty manner,” to quibble in one’s 
criticism of others.232  Ample evidence exists to support the 
proposition that Judge Posner frequently exhibits nitpicking 
tendencies when he writes concurring judicial opinions. 
Item #1: His concurrence in Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Chicago 
Area v. Kempiners which engages in tedious speculation over the 
standing of the plaintiff organization to challenge the 
constitutionality of an Illinois statute that provided “state funding 
of organizations that offer assistance in problem pregnancies, 
provided the organization does not refer or counsel for abortion.”233  
In cryptic—and ultimately trivial—language, Posner pontificates as 
follows: 
Planned Parenthood has standing to challenge this 
[statutory] proviso if there is a reasonable probability that 
striking it down would result in a tangible benefit to Planned 
Parenthood: namely, receiving money under the program.  I 
do not think Planned Parenthood has to show that it will be 
certain to receive money if the proviso is struck down; but if 
that is only a remote possibility, Planned Parenthood’s 
tangible stake in the outcome of this lawsuit is too slight to 
give it standing.234
So, Posner’s quibble in Planned Parenthood resulted in a remand 
to the district court judge to conduct “an evidentiary hearing to 
explore the questions of standing raised in [his] separate 
opinion.”235
Item #2: Posner’s concurrence to the en banc decision in Parisie v. 
Greer, which is unnecessary prolix, adds to the multiplicity of 
separate opinions, and is gratuitously petty in addressing the 
merits of the appeal with the following off-handed remarks: 
 Turning, finally, to the merits of the appeal, I cannot 
agree that the appellant is entitled to a new trial so that he 
Id. at 530. 
232 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1007 (Am. ed. 1996). 
233 700 F.2d 1115, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citation omitted). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1116 (per curiam). 
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can introduce evidence that his murder victim was a 
homosexual . . . . Parisie wants the evidence admitted in 
order to bolster his defense of “homosexual panic,” which is 
the idea that a latent homosexual—and manifest 
“homophobe”—can be so upset by a homosexual’s advances to 
him that he becomes temporarily insane, in which state he 
may kill the homosexual.  It is no business of mine whether 
the State of Illinois chooses to recognize a defense of 
“homosexual panic” as a subcategory of the insanity defense, 
but I cannot believe that the Constitution of the United 
States requires a state to allow defense counsel in a murder 
case to defame the murderer’s victim as a homosexual 
without satisfying the normal prerequisite to admitting 
evidence of reputation—that the evidence be based upon 
contact with the subject’s neighbors and associates rather 
than upon the personal opinion of the witness.236
Item #3: Posner’s concurring opinion in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. 
Wag-Aero, Inc., a trademark infringement case, which goes on and 
on to muse on the unimportant issue of whether or not a trial court’s 
determination of laches ought to be treated as a discretionary 
judgment of the trial court which should be subject to reversal on 
appeal “only for a clear abuse of discretion.”237  It is chock full of 
string citations,238 it is aridly academic in tone and substance,239 
and it indulges in digressions from digressions.240
Item #4: The Posnerian concurrence in Moore v. Marketplace 
Restaurant, Inc., agreeing with the affirmance, in part, and 
reversal, in part, of a Section 1983 action which was brought by 
individuals who were allegedly unlawfully arrested and imprisoned 
236 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
237 741 F.2d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
238 See, e.g., id. at 936. 
239 See, e.g., id. at 938 (“If I am right that the determination of laches ought not be treated 
as a discretionary judgment of the trial court, then how has the ‘abuse of discretion’ 
formulation become so entrenched?  The answer seems to be historical; the phrase is a fossil 
of legal paleontology.”). 
240 See, e.g., id. at 939. 
The time when equity relief really was discretionary—a judgment committed to the 
conscience of the chancellor—is past, the law of equity having long ago crystallized in a 
system of rules similar in basic character to the rules of the common law, though 
perhaps marginally more flexible.  See the splendid discussion of the origins of equity in 
[string citations to various works of legal history].  (But what could be more flexible than 
the concept of “due care” which underlies negligence law?). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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on charges of theft of services from a restaurant.241  The concurring 
opinion creates more confusion than light; especially given the 
remand of a significant part of the litigation to the lower court for 
jury trial.242  Moreover, the entire dispute was of a rather trivial 
nature, involving a group of out-of-towners who stopped at a 
restaurant and were so displeased with the service that they left 
without paying—ultimately to be arrested at the campground they 
were staying, and put in an unpleasant holding cell for several 
hours.243  Why did Judge Posner find it appropriate to write a 
separate opinion from the straightforward majority opinion, and to 
quibble on nearly every issue in the case as if he were a first year 
law student writing the answer to a criminal law exam? 
Item #5: In a concurring opinion to Phelps v. Duckworth, an en 
banc reversal of a panel opinion’s approval of a district court’s grant 
of habeas corpus relief, Posner led off his opinion with a frank 
admission: “I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case; 
separate opinions are the bane of the modern American 
judiciary.”244  This (almost humorous) statement is immediately 
followed by another observation that dissuades a reader from even 
bothering to go to the trouble of reading the concurrence: 
But the case so vividly illustrates the tenuous character of 
the modern law of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, 
and so urgently underscores the need for a fresh approach to 
the entire subject, that I cannot resist commenting briefly 
(too briefly to do full justice to an immensely complex area) 
on what that approach might be, though I am mindful that 
judges at our level are not empowered to adopt it.245
And when one goes to the trouble of reading Judge Posner’s 
concurring opinion in Phelps, it tends to repeat many points made 
in yet another concurrence by Judge Easterbrook, it is thick with 
dense legal historical points of questionable import, and it comes off 
as carping and niggling in complaining at its conclusion: 
I look forward to the day when the Supreme Court will 
simplify constitutional criminal procedure and allow us to 
decide cases such as this on common-sense grounds, rather 
than making us dance an elaborate quadrille that finds us 
241 754 F.2d 1336, 1338–39, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring in part). 
242 Id. at 1356. 
243 Id. at 1340–41. 
244 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
245 Id. 
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however in the same place when the music stops—with a 
conclusion that the defendant is not in custody in violation of 
the Constitution.246
There are numerous additional caviling concurring moments in 
Judge Posner’s judicial oeuvre including: wailing about the long-
standing Supreme Court gloss on Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of 
the United States Constitution—the Contract Clause—and 
characterizing the Supreme Court’s interpretations as “defang[ing] 
the [C]ontract [C]lause”;247 niggling over the differing abstract 
considerations for judicial modification of institutional reform 
consent decrees, on the one hand, and private property consent 
decrees, on the other hand;248 a rambling rant about the artistic and 
expressive merits of striptease dancing;249 fussy worry over 
federalism concerns in burden-shifting rules applicable to 
employment discrimination cases;250 picayune posturing over 
emerging jurisprudence in sexual stereotyping employment cases;251 
and irksome discussion of class-of-one equal protection litigation.252
b.  Posner is Not a Nitpicker 
Nitpicking, as previously stated, involves petty (and, therefore, 
trivial) fault-finding or hair-splitting.253  Considered in another 
way, however, most of the “nitpicking tendencies” alleged to exist in 
Judge Posner’s concurring judicial opinions254 are really examples of 
his extraordinary diligence as a federal appellate judge.  Indeed, 
these cases, examined from a different angle, are examples of: his 
rightful concern that litigants in federal litigation have proper 
standing;255 his well-founded interest in avoiding cheapening the 
meaning of habeas corpus standards in state prisoner petitions;256 
his judicious regard for articulating and applying appellate 
246 Id. at 1419. 
247 Chi. Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chi., 819 F.2d 732, 744 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
248 Money Store, Inc. v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 885 F.2d 369, 374–77 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, 
J., concurring). 
249 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–99 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
250 Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 473–77 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring). 
251 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066–68 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, 
J., concurring). 
252 Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 709–13 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring). 
253 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra Part III.B.4.a. 
255 See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text. 
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standards of review;257 his impressive responsibility in delving into 
the rights of citizens to be treated with regard to their constitutional 
privacy entitlements;258 and his free and independent role as a 
federal appellate judge to comment on matters of legal importance 
and to offer his own take on flagging, criticizing, solving, and 
reconciling legal problems.259
Looking at some further instances of nitpicking-at-first-blush 
Posnerian concurrences that, upon deeper reflection, are worthwhile 
concurring opinions can help us realize that Judge Posner typically 
has good reasons to add his penetrating insight when he chooses to 
concur.  Consider his concurrence in Greider v. Duckworth.260  On a 
surface level, perhaps, Posner seeks to split hairs in this habeas 
corpus case by seeking to separate “proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt” from proof of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.261  
But, on a deeper level of analysis, Posner is right to make this 
distinction in this case (involving a state law where the first 
standard was allocated to the state as part of the prosecutor’s prima 
facie case and the second standard allocated to the defendant as a 
potential affirmative defense).262  Take Judge Posner’s concurring 
opinion in Gotches v. Heckler.263  Upon initial reading, one might be 
tempted to view his harangue about the “unduly harsh tone of 
criticism of the government”264 in delaying resolution of a railroad 
retiree’s widow’s claim for federal benefits as trifling; yet, when one 
pauses to take in the full import of Posner’s critique, which boils 
down to the pragmatic necessity of allowing federal governmental 
officials to properly consider the consequences of signing a consent 
decree with far-ranging programmatic effects, his opinion takes on 
heft.  And scrutinize Posner’s concurrence in United States v. 
Hall.265  Why is it necessary for the judge to wax on to further 
expound upon a statement in the majority opinion that “may puzzle 
some readers,” to wit, “[a]n attempt to define reasonable doubt 
presents a risk without any real benefit?”266  A preliminary reaction 
257 See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 247–52 and accompanying text. 
260 701 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
261 Id. at 1236. 
262 Id. at 1235. 
263 773 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
264 Id.  For a discussion of Posner’s concurrence in Gotches and as an example of 
institutional concern, see supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text. 
265 854 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). 
266 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to this concurrence might be to skip the surplus that you would 
expect to follow.  But that would be a mistake because Posner has 
useful points to add to the majority opinion that held that it was not 
reversible error for the trial judge to give the jury a reasonable 
doubt instruction.267  First, Posner nods to the “district judge” who 
should be allowed, without reversal on appeal, to give a reasonable 
doubt instruction when “on the basis of his experience with juries 
and his observation of the particular jury thinks that such an 
instruction would help the jurors” in deliberating on a criminal law 
verdict.268  Second, he explains that in spite of appellate deference 
to the lower court on this matter, “ordinarily the district judge will 
be well advised to attempt no definition of reasonable doubt” 
because “[t]his advice reflects experience (almost uniformly 
negative) with attempts to define the term.”269  As Posner wisely 
points out: “The verbal elaborations that have been tried appear to 
add little if any substance to the meaning conveyed by the term 
itself; deeply entrenched in the popular culture as it is, the term 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ may be the single legal term that jurors 
understand best.”270  Thus, “[d]efinitions that translate the term 
into a probabilistic measure, while they may add content, are apt to 
mislead the jurors.”271  Third, Posner illustrates his analysis with 
colorful contrasting illustrations.  He says, “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt requires . . . that the jury be certain of the 
defendants’ guilt, with this proviso: complete certainty—the 
certainty of such propositions as that cats do not grow on trees and 
that I have never set foot on Mars—is never attainable” in a 
criminal trial setting.272  Finally, in concluding his Hall concurrence 
Judge Posner offers valuable and practical insights which usefully 
amplify the majority opinion: 
 Numerical estimates of probability are helpful in 
investments, gambling, scientific research, and many other 
activities but are not likely to be helpful in the setting of jury 
deliberations.  No objective probability of a defendant’s guilt 
can be estimated other than in the rare case that turns 
entirely on evidence whose accuracy can be rigorously 
expressed in statistical terms (e.g., fingerprints and 
267 Id. at 1037–38 (Kanne, J., majority). 
268 Id. at 1044 (Posner, J., concurring). 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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paternity tests).  In other cases the jury’s subjective estimate 
would float free of check and context.  It is one thing to tell 
jurors to set aside unreasonable doubts, another to tell them 
to determine whether the probability that the defendant is 
guilty is more than 75, or 95, or 99 percent. 
 If judges are not going to tell juries to attach a percentage 
figure to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and if attempts at 
verbal elaboration of reasonable doubt are likely to yield 
barren tautologies, it makes practical sense not to instruct 
the jury at all on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  I therefore agree with [the majority’s] admonition to 
the district judges.273
5.  Posner as Weaver of Hypotheticals and Wordplay: The Law 
Professor as Judge 
In the course of writing his concurring judicial opinions, Judge 
Posner has manifested an appetite for hypothetical scenarios and 
elegant wordplay—habits of thought that, perhaps, he carries over 
from being a law professor.274
In his concurrence in Greider v. Duckworth, Posner memorably 
describes how madness impacts the criminal law: 
 You can be insane yet still be capable of entertaining the 
subjective desire to kill a human being.  But you cannot be 
convicted of murder if you are so crazy that you kill without 
knowing what you are doing.  Thus, if Greider was under the 
delusion that he was shooting two gerbils rather than two 
human beings, he could not be guilty of murder, but if this 
delusion took the form of thinking that he had a sacred duty 
to reduce the human population by two, he could be guilty of 
murder, at least guilty prima facie, though he might have a 
defense of insanity.275
In Bohen v. City of East Chicago, a female dispatcher for the city 
fire department was fired, according to her allegations, because she 
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
273 Id. at 1044–45 (citation omitted). 
274 Judge Posner is a lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School and, prior to his 
appointment as a federal appellate judge, was a full tenured professor at that school—
becoming in 1969 the youngest tenured professor in Chicago’s history.  See Blomquist, 
Playing on Words, supra note 1, at 684. 
275 701 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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complaint concerning sexual harassment.276  Judge Posner filed a 
concurring opinion in the case involving the equal protection claim, 
noting that he “would characterize [the claim] differently from [the 
majority opinion]: not as a claim of sexual harassment but as a 
claim of failure to protect the plaintiff against such harassment.”277  
This difference in approach was “important,” as Posner put it, 
“because the male employees who actually harassed her are not the 
people she has sued.”278  Later in his separate opinion, he 
illustrated this distinction with a hypothetical: 
 All this is not to suggest that the equal protection clause 
requires a state or municipality to devote disproportionate 
resources to preventing (or, more realistically, limiting) 
sexual harassment.  Suppose the City of East Chicago had 
for purely fiscal reasons decided that in its fire department 
the law of the jungle would reign; the city would not 
discipline any employee for any misconduct, sexual or 
otherwise, toward another employee—whether the 
misconduct was theft, or battery, or rape, or anything else.  
Then women employees, even if they were hurt more by the 
policy than the men, could not complain of a selective 
withdrawal of protection, and hence of intentional 
discrimination against them, any more than they could 
complain if the city paid the market wage rate to all its 
employees and the rate happened to be higher for men than 
for women.  But the record does not suggest that the city was 
indifferent to employees’ misconduct toward each other; so 
far as appears, the city disciplined employees for all 
misconduct except sexual harassment, with the result of 
giving its female employees systematically less protection 
than its male employees.279
Judge Posner’s concurrence in Bohen crystallizes the nub of the 
dispute and offers a better way of conceptualizing the suit against 
the municipality than the majority opinion because Bohen’s action 
is against her governmental employer, not the individual male 
employees who harassed her. 
In a Title VII Civil Rights Act suit brought by a Jew, Jerold Pime, 
276 799 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 1986). 
277 Id. at 1189 (Posner, J., concurring). 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 1191 (citation omitted).  For a Law and Economics discussion of Posner’s 
concurrence, see supra note 154. 
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Loyola University of Chicago’s policy of reserving three vacancies in 
the Philosophy Department for Jesuit professors was challenged.280  
The majority opinion held that having a Jesuit presence in the 
Philosophy Department was a bona fide occupational qualification 
under the statute.281  Judge Posner agreed with the majority “that 
Pime must lose this Title VII case” but his “ground [was] different 
from and narrower than [his] brethren’s ground”; Posner thought 
that being denied a tenure-track position for not being a Jesuit was 
not a deprivation of an employment opportunity because of 
religion.282  In a first set of hypotheticals in his Pime concurrence, 
Posner explained the basis for his difference in rationale from the 
majority’s rationale: 
It is true that you cannot be a Jesuit if you are not a 
Catholic; but only a tiny fraction of Catholics are Jesuits.  If 
Pime were a Catholic but not a Jesuit he would be just as 
ineligible for the position as he is being a Jew, yet it would be 
odd indeed to accuse Loyola of discriminating against 
Catholics because it wanted to reserve some positions in its 
philosophy department for Jesuits, thus excluding most 
Catholics from consideration.  Not only is Pime’s being 
Jewish an adventitious circumstance in this case but so is 
the fact that Loyola is a Catholic school.  It is hard to believe 
that the philosophy department of the University of 
Chicago—or of Brandeis University—would be guilty of a 
prima facie violation of Title VII if it reserved a few slots for 
Jesuits, believing that the Jesuit point of view on philosophy 
was one to which its students should be exposed; and Loyola 
should have the same right.  To take another example, 
suppose Loyola reserved a slot for a rabbi, to teach Jewish 
theology; would this be a prima facie violation of Title VII?  I 
cannot believe it would be; and if this conclusion is right it 
casts doubt on my brethren’s assumption that the mere fact 
of reserving one or more slots for members of a religious 
order establishes a prima facie case.283
Based on his reasoning that “Pime ha[d] not made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination” on grounds of religion, Judge Posner 
continued his concurring opinion by arguing that “we need not 
280 Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 351 (7th Cir. 1986). 
281 Id. at 354. 
282 Id. (Posner, J., concurring). 
283 Id. at 354–55. 
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decide whether Loyola could rebut such a case by proving either 
that Loyola is a religious employer . . . or that being a Jesuit is a 
bona fide occupational qualification” under Title VII.284  Indeed, as 
Posner explains in a second set of hypotheticals in his Pime 
concurrence, the logic of such an occupational qualification is on 
shaky ground: 
Loyola wants to reserve seven of 31 tenure slots in the 
philosophy department for Jesuits, without specifying any 
subject-matter for the seven.  There is no course that it 
believes only a Jesuit qualified to teach; it wants Jesuits in 
the department in order to maintain (as my brethren put it) 
“the educational tradition and character of the institution.”  
Although a worthy objective, this may not create the tight fit 
that the statute appears to require by the words “reasonably 
necessary.”  No doubt it would be nice to have a minimum 
number of Jesuits in a school with a strong Jesuit tradition 
but by this type of reasoning the concept of bona fide 
occupational qualification could expand almost without limit.  
On the same type of showing made here, a men’s clothing 
store could claim a right to hire only men as salesmen in 
order to maintain the character of the store, or Ivy League 
universities the right to maintain a ceiling on the number of 
Jews in some departments in order to maintain the 
traditional character of those departments and of the 
university.285
Posner effectively and powerfully deployed allusions to irrational 
methods of divination in his concurring opinion in Marozsan v. 
United States,286 a case reargued en banc before the entire Seventh 
Circuit.  He agreed with the majority’s holding that a veterans’ 
benefit statute, which foreclosed judicial review of the Veterans’ 
Administration actions with respect to benefits, did not, however, 
preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of procedures used 
by the government agency in denying benefits.287  Judge Posner 
wrote separately, in part, to rail against what he characterized as “a 
textbook illustration of the deficiencies of literalism as a style of 
statutory interpretation.”288  His divination allusion is packaged in 
284 Id. at 356. 
285 Id. 
286 852 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 1482. 
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the form of a hypothetical: 
 The government acknowledges that there is no purchase 
in the language or history of the [veterans’ benefits] statute 
for a distinction between procedural and substantive 
constitutional claims. . . .  The distinction lacks even 
intuitive appeal unless one contrasts a strong substantive 
claim with a weak procedural one . . . .  Compare instead a 
contention that a difference in the level of veterans’ benefits 
based on whether the veteran participated in a declared war 
rather than in an undeclared war is arbitrary, and hence a 
denial of equal protection . . . with a contention that the 
Veterans’ Administration denies a veteran due process of law 
by submitting his claim to trial by Ouija board or Tarot pack.  
It would be arbitrary to suggest that the first contention 
could ground a federal suit but not the second.  The only 
principled ground for a decision in favor of the government in 
this case would be that the judicial correction of 
unconstitutional denials of veterans’ benefit claims is 
forbidden no matter what the nature of the constitutional 
infirmity.289
Posner’s concurring opinions are chock-full of hypotheticals which 
he utilizes to clarify his own approach to issues as well as to make 
rhetorical points.  Thus, in his concurring opinion in Money Store, 
Inc. v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., he warns against strict limits on 
judicial modification of consent decrees in “litigation seeking to 
reform private institutions”;290 in his concurrence in Miller v. Civil 
City of South Bend, he seems to think out loud by opining that “[i]t 
is tempting to argue that a striptease just can’t be expressive 
because if it is then everything is—including kicking one’s 
wastebasket in anger and putting geraniums in a window box”;291 in 
his concurring opinion in Ragsdale v. Turnock, he notes, by way of a 
hypothetical, to point out that “for many purposes the law does treat 
[fetuses] as people” such that “[i]n Illinois, if you shoot a pregnant 
289 Id. (emphasis added). 
290 885 F.2d 369, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring).  His hypothetical states: 
 Suppose a group of white workers brought a “reverse discrimination” suit complaining 
about the effect of their employer’s affirmative-action plan on the employment of whites.  
The employer might be entirely willing to consent to the entry of a decree that would 
make it more difficult to hire blacks.  If the black workers persuaded the employer to 
seek modification of the decree, the court ought not consider itself cabined . . . . 
Id. 
291 904 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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woman in the abdomen and kill the fetus, you are guilty of the 
crime of intentional homicide of an unborn child, and the penalty is 
almost as severe as for first-degree murder”;292 concurring in United 
States v. Gage, he illustrates that “[i]ntention and desire are not 
synonyms” in the law by the hypothetical: “If you plant a bomb in a 
plane desiring only to kill the passenger whose heir you are, you are 
guilty of first-degree murder (deliberate, premeditated) of the other 
passengers who die in the crash as well, even though you didn’t 
desire their death”;293 in his concurrence in EEOC v. Indiana Bell 
Telephone Co., he proposes a hypothetical case to show that it may 
be relevant in a future case of workplace harassment for a collective 
bargaining agreement to be considered as part of a potential 
defense;294 and his concurring opinion in Bell v. Duperrault 
hypothesizes “irrational differences in treatment having nothing to 
do with discrimination against a vulnerable class abound at the 
bottom rung of law enforcement” such that “federal courts will be 
swamped with ‘class of one’ cases remote from the purpose . . . of the 
equal protection clause”295 under the following illustration: 
A police car is lurking on the shoulder of a highway in a 45 
m.p.h. zone, a car streaks by at 65 m.p.h. and the police do 
nothing.  Two minutes later a car streaks by at 60 m.p.h. and 
the police give that driver a ticket.  Is it a denial of equal 
protection if the police cannot come up with a rational 
292 941 F.2d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J., concurring). 
293 183 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
294 256 F.3d 516, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring).  Judge Posner 
wrote: 
 Let me propose a hypothetical case, not altogether remote from the present one though 
readily distinguishable from it, to which the existence and terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement would be relevant.  A worker complains to a supervisor that 
another worker is harassing her.  The supervisor responds by immediately transferring 
the alleged harasser to another part of the workplace.  But because of the design of the 
workplace the transfer does not keep the two workers apart all the time and the worker 
who complained insists to the supervisor that the harasser be fired.  The supervisor 
replies that the company’s collective bargaining agreement protects workers from being 
fired other than for cause and entitles any worker sought to be terminated for cause to 
notice and a hearing before a joint labor-management committee with appeal to an 
arbitrator, the entire procedure from complaint to final arbitration to be completed 
within 21 days.  The complaint is filed and the arbitrator rules that the accusation of 
harassment is false and indeed malicious and therefore that there is no basis for 
terminating the harasser or even for separating him from the complainant. 
 Suppose the complainant then brought suit against the company under Title VII, 
charging that it had acted unreasonably in failing to fire her alleged harasser, as she had 
urged. 
Id. 
295 367 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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explanation for why they ticketed the slower speeder?296
Judge Posner’s masterful use of hypotheticals and appropriate 
allusions in his concurring judicial opinions are incisive and 
instructive to the bench and bar alike.  Moreover, this creative 
wordplay helps him to grope his way through issues in many cases 
that he judges on appeal, and to arrive at nuanced and measured 
takes on these often complex doctrinal matters. 
6.  Posner the Great: Of Finding and Cutting Judicial Gordian 
Knots 
Legend has it that when Alexander the Great took up the ancient 
challenge of untying the famous Gordian Knot, he “solved” the 
puzzle by taking his sword and cutting the knot in two.297  In the 
same spirit, Judge Posner has frequently used concurring opinions 
to cut a variety of legal knots that have hamstrung his fellow 
judges. 
In his concurrence in Gautreaux v. Pierce, for example, Posner 
wrote that he was “not persuaded by the grounds on which the 
district court [and his appellate colleagues] rejected the [plaintiffs’] 
objections to” the density requirements of a public housing project in 
Chicago.298  Judge Posner “would affirm but on another ground.”299  
That bold alternative ground was based on a lack of standing: “these 
appellants are neither parties to the [consent] decree nor third-
party beneficiaries; therefore they have no standing to complain 
that its terms are being violated.”300
Posner’s concurring opinion in Pime v. Loyola University of 
Chicago—an opinion that we have previously examined as an 
example of Posnerian hypotheticals and wordplay301—can also be 
viewed as an instance of Posner wanting to resolve an appeal on a 
bold alternative ground which nonetheless agrees with the result of 
the majority opinion on appeal in dismissing the claim.302  In Pime, 
296 Id. 
297 In 333 B.C. “[a]t Gordium in Phrygia, tradition records his cutting of the Gordian knot, 
which could only be loosed by the man who was to rule Asia; but this story may be apocryphal 
or at least distorted.”  Alexander III the Great, 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 468, 
469 (15th ed. 1974). 
298 707 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 272.  For discussion of Posner’s Gautreaux concurrence as an institutional 
critique, see supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
302 803 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring). 
BLOMQUIST.FINALFORPUBLISHER.DOC 1/16/2008  10:45:32 AM 
2008] Concurrence, Posner-Style 93 
 
Posner characterized the employment discrimination suit by a 
Jewish professor, who complained about the university’s reservation 
of tenure track slots in the philosophy department for Jesuit 
scholars as religious discrimination, as not really involving religious 
discrimination at all.303  Accordingly, he thought the majority’s 
reliance on the bona fide occupational qualification defense of Title 
VII was unwise and unnecessary.304  As Posner opined: 
 If I am wrong in thinking that Loyola is not guilty of 
prima facie discrimination, I would give serious 
consideration to interpreting the defense of bona fide 
occupational qualification broadly enough to reach what 
Loyola has done, for it seems so remote from any concern 
that Congress had when it passed Title VII.  But it is not 
necessary to decide whether Loyola has made out this 
defense and I think it would be the better part of valor to 
forgo reliance on it and place decision on the narrower 
ground.  For reasons having nothing to do with antipathy to 
Jews or other non-Catholics, Loyola wants to have a certain 
proportion of its philosophy professors drawn from a 
particular religious order to which, as I have said, most 
Catholics do not belong and could not belong, because they 
would be either unable to satisfy the demanding entrance 
requirements or unwilling to take the vows of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience.  In giving a modest and thoroughly 
understandable preference to members of this order, in 
circumstances that rebut any inference of invidious 
discrimination, Loyola is not discriminating against 
members of any religious faith within the meaning of Title 
VII.305
Judge Posner’s concurrence in United States v. Jackson is another 
prominent example of his penchant for cutting to the essential heart 
of the matter.306  Instead of relying on the majority opinion’s 
principal ground that the criminal defendant was improperly left in 
the dark, and did not receive adequate notice, prior to his 
sentencing for bank fraud concerning a more severe sentence 
because of Jackson’s purported abuse of a position of trust,307 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 356. 
305 Id. at 357. 
306 32 F.3d 1101, 1111 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
307 Id. at 1110 (majority opinion). 
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Posner thought it better to resolve the appeal on the less 
controversial, alternative ground that the sentencing judge erred in 
presuming that Jackson “had abused a position of trust.”308  
Referencing the criminal law doctrine of “plain error,” which allows 
an appellate court to notice and correct palpable trial error, “even if 
it is not argued” on appeal,309 Posner unsheathed his sword and 
verbally cut through the lack of notice verbiage in the majority 
opinion as follows: 
Although the point is not argued by Jackson’s lawyer, it is 
virtually certain that the district judge erred in holding that 
Jackson had abused a position of trust.  He was a money 
marketing clerk paid $15,000 a year.  A job so denominated 
and so meagerly remunerated is most unlikely to have been 
more responsible than that of a teller, and the [advisory] 
note to the relevant guideline says that embezzlement or 
theft by an ordinary bank teller does not warrant an 
adjustment for abuse of trust.310
Yet, Judge Posner in his concurrences has also cut through legal 
knots to forcefully make the case for a broader ground of decision 
than the majority based its holding upon.  His 1998 concurring 
opinion in Rodriguez v. City of Chicago exemplifies this approach.311  
Rodriguez, a Chicago police officer, sued the city alleging that the 
police department engaged in religious discrimination in violation of 
Title VII in refusing to excuse him from guarding abortion clinics in 
the police district to which he was assigned.312  The majority held 
that the officer had not been discriminated against in violation of 
the statute because the police department had provided Rodriguez 
with the opportunity, through the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, to transfer with no reduction in his level of 
compensation to a district within the city that did not have an 
abortion clinic.313  Writing in his, then, capacity as Chief Judge of 
the Circuit, Posner would have audaciously held—in addition to 
that Rodriguez had been afforded appropriate accommodation—
“that police officers and firefighters have no right under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recuse themselves from having to 
protect persons of whose activities they disapprove for religious (or 
308 Id. at 1112 (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
309 Id. 
310 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
311 156 F.3d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
312 Id. at 773–74 (majority opinion). 
313 Id. at 778. 
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any other) reasons.”314  As an initial matter, Judge Posner’s 
concurring opinion confidently asserts a theory for sometimes 
deciding cases on broad rather than narrow grounds: 
 It is a matter of judgment whether to base the decision of 
an appeal on a broad ground, on a narrow ground, or on both, 
when both types of ground are available.  If the judges are 
dubious about the broad ground, then they will do well to 
decide only on the narrow ground; but if they are confident of 
the broad ground, they should base decision on that ground 
(as well as on the narrow ground, if equally confident of it) in 
order to maximize the value of the decision in guiding the 
behavior of persons seeking to comply with the law.  One of 
the most important things that appellate courts do is to 
formulate rules of law.  They would formulate very few rules, 
and leave the law in a state of considerable and avoidable 
uncertainty, if they always chose to decide a case on the 
narrowest possible ground.  It is true that the broader the 
ground, the more likely it is to sweep in cases that the judges 
cannot perfectly foresee, and this argues for caution in 
deciding cases on broad grounds, because there is greater 
risk of error, and for a willingness to carve exceptions as new 
cases imperfectly foreseen arise.  But I think that we could 
prudently have gone further in this case than the majority 
opinion does to clarify the law governing the duty of public-
safety agencies to accommodate the religious beliefs of their 
employees, rather than leave the law in a state of uncertainty 
which the majority opinion may actually increase.315
As a second matter, Posner offered policy justifications for a 
blanket rule of no cause of action under Title VII to claim exemption 
from duties to protect the public.  In this regard, he opined that 
Rodriguez “is not entitled to demand that his police duties be 
altered to conform to his [religious views] any more than a volunteer 
member of the armed forces is entitled to demand that he be 
excused from performing military duties that conflict with his 
religious faith.”316  Moreover, Posner would extend the analogy by 
disclaiming that “a firefighter is entitled to demand that he be 
entitled to refuse to fight fires in the places of worship of religious 
314 Id. at 779 (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
315 Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
316 Id. at 779. 
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sects that he regards as Satanic.”317  According to Judge Posner, 
“[t]he objection to recusal in all of these cases” is not governmental 
inconvenience but “the loss of public confidence in governmental 
protective services if the public knows that its protectors are at 
liberty to pick and choose whom to protect.”318  He went on to 
express this policy consideration in concrete and vivid prose: 
 The public knows that its protectors have a private 
agenda; everyone does.  But it would like to think that they 
leave that agenda at home when they are on duty—that 
Jewish policemen protect neo-Nazi demonstrators, that 
Roman Catholic policemen protect abortion clinics, that 
Black Muslim policemen protect Christians and Jews, that 
fundamentalist Christian policemen protect noisy atheists 
and white-hating Rastafarians, that Mormon policemen 
protect Scientologists, and that Greek-Orthodox policemen of 
Serbian ethnicity protect Roman Catholic Croats.  We judges 
certainly want to think that U.S. Marshals protect us from 
assaults and threats without regard to whether, for example, 
we vote for or against the pro-life position in abortion 
cases.319
To Posner, “[t]he importance of public confidence in the neutrality 
of its protectors is so great that a police department or fire 
department or equivalent public-safety agency that decides not to 
allow recusal by its employees should be able to plead undue 
hardship and thus escape any duty of accommodation.”320
In another concurring opinion in Shields v. Local 705, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Plan,321 Judge 
Posner, like in his broad and bold concurrence in Rodriguez,322 
wanted to cut the Gordian Knot involving the ERISA principle of 
promissory estoppel; he would “hold that promissory estoppel can 
never be used to alter the terms of a defined-benefit plan, especially 
when it is a multiemployer plan.”323  Policy considerations were 
paramount in Posner’s broad analysis.  He observed, in this regard, 
that: 
If terms are added by the operation of promissory estoppel 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
321 188 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
322 See supra notes 311–20 and accompanying text. 
323 Shields, 188 F.3d at 903. 
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that appear nowhere in the plan documents upon which the 
actuarial calculations are based, that the actuaries who 
designed the funding mechanism in the plan did not know 
about, and that . . . do not purport merely to summarize the 
plan, the plan may turn out to be seriously underfunded.  
These considerations are decisive against allowing the 
invocation of promissory estoppel in any case involving a 
defined-benefit plan.324
7.  Posner as Reader and Interpreter of Statutes: Searching for 
Pragmatic Construction 
As one who is fascinated by the theory and practice of statutory 
construction,325 it is not surprising that Judge Posner has taken up 
this subject in the course of several of his concurring judicial 
opinions.  Posner’s concurrences which have focused on problems of 
interpreting statutes are vivid, penetrating, and helpful.  These 
opinions are not some abstract exercise in language amusements or 
diversions.  Rather, a Posnerian concurring opinion about 
interpreting statutory commands typically pays attention to the 
purpose of the provision under review and how that purpose can be 
practically carried out by the judiciary.  Take his concurring opinion 
in St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. v. United States where he disagreed 
with the majority that a provision of the Internal Revenue Code 
governed a transfer of stock by a father to a trust for his children’s 
education pursuant to a divorce settlement;326 Posner opined that 
“[t]here is grave doubt that the statute is intended to have any 
application except in gift-tax cases but in any event it has no useful 
application to this case.”327  Rather than warping the language and 
purpose of the statutory provision to fit the facts of the case, Posner 
agreed that the distribution of stock was taxable to the father but 
for the reasons of a binding Supreme Court precedent that he 
claimed applied to the case at bar.328
Take another concurring opinion by Judge Posner that turned on 
issues of statutory interpretation: Michels v. United States Olympic 
Committee.329  Michels was a suit for injunction by an American 
324 Id. at 905. 
325 See Blomquist, Aesthetics of Canonicity, supra note 5, at 171. 
326 716 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
327 Id. at 1187. 
328 Id. 
329 741 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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weightlifter who was successful in obtaining a preliminary 
injunction from the district court, pursuant to the Amateur Sports 
Act of 1978;330 the preliminary injunction ordered the United States 
Olympic Committee (USOC) “to name . . . Michels as a conditional 
alternate to the 1984 United States Olympic Weightlifting Team 
and to address the merits of Michels’ claims under International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) procedures.”331  Posner agreed with the 
majority that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 did not permit private 
enforcement of the statute because of a compromise between 
legislative sponsors backed up by the common sense “reflection that 
there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for 
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the 
eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.”332  
Judge Posner wrote separately, however, to argue that even if the 
statute “could be enforced by a private suit, this suit would have to 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.”333  On this separate 
ground for vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction, 
Judge Posner looked to both the text and purpose of the legislation 
under scrutiny.  As to the text, Posner pointed out that “[t]he only 
relevant duty imposed by the Act is the duty of the United States 
Olympic Committee to establish procedures for resolving disputes 
involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity of an 
amateur athlete . . . to participate in the Olympic Games.”334  
Michels’ dispute was “with the International Weightlifting 
Federation, an international organization that is not a member of 
the USOC” and, as Posner explained, “[h]is dispute was with the 
nonmember, the international federation, and it was outside the 
scope” of the statute.335  As to the purpose of the statute, it makes 
sense, according to Posner, that “the statute does not require the 
U.S. Olympic Committee to establish machinery for resolving 
disputes between athletes and nonmembers” since “[t]he USOC has 
no control over nonmembers,” and, thus, “[t]he International 
Weightlifting Federation can thumb its collective nose at the U.S. 
Olympic Committee” and “if the USOC tried to put Michels on the 
U.S. Olympic Weightlifting team in defiance of the IWF’s expulsion, 
330 Id. at 156 (majority opinion); 36 U.S.C. §§ 371–396 (1978) (current version at 36 U.S.C. 
§§ 220501–220529 (1998)). 
331 Michels, 741 F.2d at 156. 
332 Id. at 158–59 (Posner, J., concurring). 
333 Id. at 159. 
334 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
335 Id. 
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the IWF could ask the International Olympic Committee to 
disqualify the team.”336
Consider Judge Posner’s statutory analysis in his concurrence in 
United States v. OCCI Co. where he expressed doubts concerning 
existing precedent “that a mortgagor can set up, as an affirmative 
defense to foreclosure by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Department’s failure to comply with the 
statement of national housing objectives in 42 U.S.C. § 1441.”337  
Seeking to sensibly consider whether Congress had a purpose in 
passing the national housing legislation to allow delinquent 
borrowers from the federal government to delay and complicate 
government foreclosures, Posner wrote: 
 In this protracted [statutory] recital of hopes and homilies, 
one finds few specifics . . . and none that bear on foreclosure 
or could provide any guidance for a court called on to review 
a decision to foreclose.  I think Congress would be surprised 
and dismayed to discover that by trying to give guidance of 
the most general sort—inspiration would be a better word—
to HUD, it had made it harder for HUD to foreclose on 
delinquent mortgages, by giving mortgagors an argument 
with which to delay and very occasionally defeat foreclosure 
or at least make the process of foreclosure more costly.338
Note Posner’s purposeful statutory assessment of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in his concurring opinion in Pime v. Loyola 
University of Chicago;339 his careful review of the legislative history 
of the religious-employer exemption led him to conclude that it was 
inappropriate to apply the exception in the case at bar.340  Look at 
Judge Posner’s insistence on “the deficiencies of literalism as a style 
of statutory interpretation” and his claim that “[t]he idea that 
semantically unambiguous sentences—sentences clear ‘on their 
face’—sentences whose meaning is ‘plain’—can be interpreted 
without reference to purpose inferred from context is fallacious,” in 
his concurrence in Marozsan v. United States.341  In his concurring 
opinion in Marozsan he rejected a literal interpretation of a 
veterans’ benefits statute that would have precluded judicial 
336 Id. at 159 (citations omitted). 
337 758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
338 Id. at 1167. 
339 803 F.2d 351, 354–58 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring). 
340 Id. at 357–58. 
341 852 F.2d 1469, 1482 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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review.342  And, observe Posner’s measured interpretation of the 
federal pension benefit statute, ERISA, in his Shields v. Local 705, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Plan concurrence 
when he wrote that “courts in ERISA cases retain their normal 
common law powers to fill gaps in the statute.  For statutes are 
rarely comprehensive; they are enacted against a rich background of 
common law principles that can be drawn on, as necessary, to put 
flesh on the legislative skeleton” subject to the following important 
interpretational qualification: “[A]ny common law elaborations of an 
incomplete statute [addressing such issues as equitable or 
promissory estoppel] must be consistent with the statute’s language 
and animating policies.”343
8.  Posner’s Concerns About Standards of Appellate Review: 
Judging Lower-Level Decision-Makers 
Judge Posner is well-aware of the critical importance of the 
standard of appellate review;344 he has elaborated on this concern in 
assorted concurring opinions.  For example, in his concurrence in 
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., he devotes his entire opinion 
to considering which of two standards of review (“clear abuse of 
discretion” or “clearly erroneous”) should govern appellate review of 
“a district judge’s finding in a trademark or other intellectual-
property case that the plaintiff was or was not guilty of laches.”345  
In clear and concise prose he probes analogous standards of review 
for what he refers to as “pure factfindings” and “application of 
substantive rules to facts of the who-did-what-to-whom variety.”346  
He affords a clarifying example to help understanding: “[I]f a 
district judge found that the defendant in a personal-injury case had 
been negligent, this finding, like a finding that the defendant had 
been going 50 miles per hour, could be overturned on appeal only if 
clearly erroneous.”347  Moreover, in a tour-de-force of analysis, 
Posner delineates that the review standard of “clear error has been 
held to be the proper standard for reviewing determinations of most 
342 Id. (discussing 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (repealed 1991)). 
343 188 F.3d 895, 904 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
344 Cf. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 372 (1999) (quoting FRANK M. COFFIN, ON 
APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 114 (1994) (“[As an appellate judge, a] clear, 
succinct, and authority-supported statement of standard of review gets me off to a good start 
[in reading the briefs in a case.]”)). 
345 741 F.2d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring). 
346 Id. at 936. 
347 Id. (citations omitted). 
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mixed questions of law and fact in intellectual-property cases,” and 
“[a]lthough some such questions, particularly in patent cases, are 
treated as questions of law rather than questions of fact, none are 
treated as discretionary determinations.”348
Another prominent example of Judge Posner’s use of concurring 
opinions to examine and re-examine precedents concerning 
standards of review is his concurrence in United States v. OCCI 
Co.349  In that concurrence Posner took the unusual step for an 
appellate judge to urge that review of decisions by HUD on whether 
or not to foreclose on a government mortgage should be 
“unreviewable.”350  His reasons for this view are practical: “I do not 
know what constructive contribution this or any other court can 
make to the achievement of the nation’s housing goals by reviewing 
HUD’s decision to foreclose” a government mortgage.351  In addition, 
according to his concurrence, “[t]here is no definite standard for a 
reviewing court to apply, and, given the lack of such a standard, 
little likelihood that a responsible reviewing court will ever 
invalidate, under [the statute], a decision to foreclose.”352  
Furthermore, he added in this regard: “All that judicial review can 
do in this setting is delay foreclosure and thereby complicate HUD’s 
already daunting mission.  If ever there was a case where judicial 
review was unavailable because [as provided for under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,] ‘agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law’ . . . this is the case.”353
Judge Posner’s concurrence in Short v. Belleville Shoe 
Manufacturing Co. provides another good illustration of his 
penchant for unflinching consideration for the dimensions of 
appropriate appellate standards of review.354  The heart of Posner’s 
point in his concurrence was the “standardless, discretionary 
judgment” on appeal that is created when federal appellate courts 
“[b]orrow[] a period of limitations from one statute to use with 
another that doesn’t have its own limitations provision” in a 
dispute.355  His concern focused on the multifactored considerations 
that bore on borrowing a statute of limitations “with no weights on 
348 Id. at 936–37 (citations omitted). 
349 758 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
350 Id. at 1167. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000)) (other citations omitted). 
354 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). 
355 Id. at 1393–94. 
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the factors.”356  Thus: 
Since courts cannot be expected to converge on a uniform 
outcome when they are operating under such a standard, 
predicting what statute of limitations will be borrowed is 
impossible and as a result extensive litigation often is 
necessary before a definitive conclusion on the limitations 
period emerges.  It may not come until a Supreme Court 
decision is rendered resolving an intercircuit conflict that 
was years in the brewing.357
Writing in United States v. McKinney, Judge Posner’s concurring 
opinion spent considerable ink over “a disagreement within the 
[Seventh Circuit] over the standard for reviewing determinations of 
probable cause.”358  He voiced his opinion that in reviewing probable 
cause determinations by lower-level decision makers “the proper 
standard is the clearly-erroneous rule used in other areas of law to 
review the application of a legal standard to a particular set of 
facts.”359  Drawing together, by way of an example, “a finding of 
negligence in an ordinary tort suit,” with the finding of probable 
cause in a criminal matter, Posner opined that the former 
determination “is not a finding of fact in the sense that it could be 
made by someone uninstructed in the legal standard of negligence.  
Rather it is the application of the legal standard to the facts of the 
particular case.”360  Reviews of negligence findings, Posner points 
out, are not de novo, but, rather, are “reviewed for clear error.”361  
So too, should appellate review of criminal law probable cause 
findings be “deferential.”362
Judge Posner’s concurring opinions that have discussed appellate 
standards of review skillfully penetrate to the nub of matters on 
appeal in federal courts: Which decision maker is in the best 
position to grapple with the issue in question?  What values should 
apply in making and second-guessing various matters?  And what 
benefits and costs attend the use of one appellate standard of review 
rather than another? 
 
356 Id. at 1394. 
357 Id. 
358 919 F.2d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). 
359 Id. at 418–19. 
360 Id. at 419. 
361 Id. (citations omitted). 
362 Id. 
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9.  Posner Speaking Frankly: Bracing Directness as a Stylistic 
Technique 
Ah, what power and panache can come about from frank, 
unadorned communication instead of prolix exercises in beating 
around legal bushes!  Judge Posner’s concurring opinions are 
replete with powerfully direct language.  One of his best no-holds-
barred concurrences was in United States v. Kaminski, at the start 
of his career as a federal appellate judge, when he decided to “write 
separately . . . to float a suggestion for giving practical content to 
the elusive concept, which is fundamental to the entrapment 
doctrine, of predisposition to commit a crime.”363  In a passage, 
worthy of full quotation, he wrote: 
 If the police entice someone to commit a crime who would 
not have done so without their blandishments, and then 
arrest him and he is prosecuted, convicted, and punished, 
law enforcement resources are squandered in the following 
sense: resources that could and should have been used in an 
effort to reduce the nation’s unacceptably high crime rate are 
used instead in the entirely sterile activity of first inciting 
and then punishing a crime.  However, if the police are just 
inducing someone to commit sooner a crime he would have 
committed eventually, but to do so in controlled 
circumstances where the costs to the criminal justice system 
of apprehension and conviction are minimized, the police are 
economizing on resources.  It is particularly difficult to catch 
arsonists, so if all the police were doing here was making it 
easier to catch an arsonist . . . they were using law 
enforcement resources properly and there is no occasion for 
judicial intervention.  And I am persuaded that that is the 
situation in this case. 
 Thus in my view “entrapment” is merely the name we give 
to a particularly unproductive use of law enforcement 
resources, which our system properly condemns.  If this is 
right, the implementing concept of “predisposition to crime” 
calls less for psychological conjecture than for a common-
sense assessment of whether it is likely that the defendant 
would have committed the crime anyway—without the 
blandishments the police used on him—but at a time and 
363 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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place where it would have been more difficult for them to 
apprehend him and the state to convict him, or whether the 
police used threats or promises so powerful that a law-
abiding individual was induced to commit a crime.  If the 
latter is the case, the police tactics do not merely affect the 
timing and location of a crime; they cause crime.364
On more frequent occasions, Judge Posner deploys phrases that 
cut to the bone or sweep away niceties to uncover what is most 
germane, what is essential, and where wisdom can be found.  His 
concurrences are loaded with this type of language, to wit: 
“[T]his protracted recital of hopes and homilies.”365
“We stray . . . when we say that the failure to promote a person 
is . . . evidence that he was a victim of discrimination, when in fact 
there is no reason to think he was even qualified for the promotion, 
let alone that he was the best qualified for it.”366
“I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case; separate 
opinions are the bane of the modern American judiciary.”367
“[T]he reservation of a few tenure slots for Jesuits in a private 
university founded by and to some extent still controlled by 
Jesuits . . . is less offensive than a racial quota in a steel mill or a 
fire department.”368
“Karl Marx said that every great event or personality appears 
twice in history: first as tragedy and then as farce.  This case, a 
prisoner’s civil rights case, illustrates his adage, provided we do not 
insist on the greatness of the event.”369
“Persons who would . . . rob a bank in the face of [a] 20-year 
sentence are unlikely to be deterred by tightening the punishments 
screws still further.  A civilized society locks up such people until 
age makes them harmless but it does not keep them in prison until 
they die.”370
“[I]f attempts at verbal elaboration of reasonable doubt are likely 
to yield barren tautologies, it makes practical sense not to instruct 
the jury at all on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable 
364 Id. 
365 United States v. OCCI Co., 758 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). 
366 Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 137 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
367 Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
368 Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring). 
369 Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring). 
370 United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). 
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doubt.”371
“Inadequate punishment can work a miscarriage of justice, just as 
excessive punishment can.”372
 Thirty years ago a striptease that ended in complete 
nudity would have been thought obscene.  No more.  It is 
worth pausing a moment to ask why.  Nudity as titillation or 
outrage is relative rather than absolute.  In a society in 
which women customarily go about in public bare-breasted, 
there is no shock value in a bare breast, while in Victorian 
England . . . a bare ankle was a sensation.373
And, let us not overlook the following instances of Posnerian 
plainspoken, upfront candor in his concurrences: 
The Supreme Court’s unwavering attachment to the 
principle leaves us no choice but to apply it, but that 
attachment is beginning to be questioned, and I would like to 
add my small voice to the chorus. 
 Borrowing a period of limitations from one statute to use 
with another that doesn’t have its own limitations provision 
is a matter of which round peg to stuff in a square hole.374
“By such ostrich methods an incoherent approach to the review of 
probable-cause determinations is perpetuated.”375
“[O]nly in law is ‘innovative’ a pejorative.”376
“Now all can see that the circuit’s position is a Rube Goldberg 
invention: a needlessly complex machine, which incidentally does 
not work.”377
“I am not trying to defy the Supreme Court.”378
“My brethren in defending the intermediate standard may in any 
event be spitting into the wind.”379
“In plumping for an intermediate standard my brethren are 
bailing water from a ship that the captain has decided to scuttle.”380
371 United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). 
372 United States v. D’Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1222 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring). 
373 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (reh’g en banc) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
374 Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
375 United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 420–21 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
376 Id. at 421 (parentheses omitted). 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 422. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. 
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“My brethren have become hopelessly entangled in words—they 
have forgotten Justice Holmes’s admonition to think things not 
words—but even at the level of semantics they strike out.”381
“What is needed . . . is not a multiplicity of rigid rules stated in 
empty jargon, or even three rigid rules that hack crudely at a 
complex reality, but the sensitive application of the clear-error 
standard.”382
 American law is too vague, too complicated, too expensive; 
and it is these things in part because judges are too fond of 
sterile verbalisms and outmoded distinctions.  A tripartite 
standard of appellate review of determinations of probable 
cause is confusing, unworkable, and unnecessary.  We should 
not fear to reject it for fear of being called innovative.383
“To object to a settlement on the ground that you shouldn’t have 
done as well in the settlement as you did identifies you as an 
ideological litigant; and an affront to one’s ideology is not an 
interest that will support standing to sue.”384
“[A] government official has decided to allow . . . human beings to 
die because the official lacks the stomach, political or otherwise, to 
litigate the case in the Supreme Court.”385
“The acts of concealment were the acts by which the parties to the 
kickbacks sought through the use of dummy corporations and the 
like to make it difficult for anyone to discover that kickbacks were 
being paid.”386
“This is a harsh law, and one would expect the government in 
enforcing it to make at least modest efforts to guard against 
mistakes.”387
“The INS was playing cat and mouse.”388  “The procedural 
sloppiness demonstrated by the INS . . . , although extraordinary, is 
not grounds for reversal.”389
“Should a 90–year–old commit arson, it might unduly depreciate 
the gravity of his act to sentence him to a term of years equal to his 
381 Id. at 423. 
382 Id. 
383 Id. 
384 Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
385 Id. at 509. 
386 Martin v. Consultants & Adm’rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
387 Ghaly v. INS, 48 F.3d 1426, 1436 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring). 
388 Id. at 1437. 
389 Id. at 1438. 
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life expectancy.”390
“If the producer of Antony and Cleopatra refuses to cast an 
effeminate man as Antony or a mannish woman as Cleopatra, he is 
not discriminating against men in the first case and women in the 
second, although he is catering to the audience’s sex stereotypes.”391
10.  En Banc Posner: Adding His Two-Cents 
A final way to look at the concurring opinions of Judge Richard A. 
Posner in his first twenty-five years on the federal appellate bench 
is to observe his infrequent, though forceful, penchant for providing 
his particular take, his emphases, his vision of a particular area of 
federal jurisprudence that results in an en banc opinion by the full 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
By way of illustration, Posner has written separate concurrences 
in en banc proceedings in a 1983 case involving a habeas corpus 
proceeding by a state prisoner;392 a suit by a former FBI agent 
seeking damages against his former superior;393 a 1985 case 
involving a habeas corpus proceeding by a state prisoner;394 a 1986 
case involving a suit by a disgruntled federal job seeker denied 
employment;395 a 1988 Section 1983 civil rights case against a fire 
dispatcher based on a failure to provide emergency rescue 
services;396 a 1988 appeal by a veteran seeking to challenge the 
constitutionality of procedures employed by the Veteran’s 
Administration in denying him benefits;397 a 1990 case brought by 
nude dancers and establishments offering nude dancing challenging 
the constitutionality of Indiana’s public indecency statute;398 and a 
390 United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 849 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring) 
(parentheses omitted). 
391 Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
392 Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc denial of 
reconsideration) (Posner, J., concurring). 
393 Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring).  
394 Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
395 Perry v. FBI, 781 F.2d 1294, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
396 Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1224 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
397 Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (7th Cir. 1988) (reh’g en banc) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
398 Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–90 (7th Cir. 1990) (reh’g en banc) 
(Posner, J., concurring). 
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2001 appeal involving the EEOC’s interpretation of federal 
employment law against sexual harassment, and a collective 
bargaining agreement between the employer and a labor union.399  
In the course of his concurring opinions to en banc circuit opinions, 
Judge Posner has done more than to rehash legal analysis found in 
the other opinions in the cases.  Rather, his analysis has been 
typically penetrating and perspicacious. 
IV.  SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS 
A.  Judge Posner’s Evolving Style: The Strategic Inspiration of 
Consubstantiality 
In a quarter-century of judicial concurring opinions, Judge 
Richard A. Posner has filed a number of true concurring opinions—
“announc[ing] and defend[ing] the author’s unwillingness to 
subscribe to the majority’s rationale for an outcome that the author 
supports.”400  Prominent Posnerian true concurrences were in 
Gautreaux v. Pierce (where he forcefully argued that a consent 
decree that authorized a federal housing official to approve various 
percentage of public housing to a “best interest of the community” 
standard was nonjusticiable);401 in EEOC v. Indiana Bell Telephone 
Co. (where he vigorously questioned the institutional wisdom of full 
court review of panel appellate opinions when the full appellate 
court lacked experience in making generalizations about the 
relevance of collective bargaining agreements in employment 
discrimination suits);402 and in Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago 
(where he emphatically disputed the very existence of religious 
discrimination and argued that it was unwise to decide the case by 
application of the bona fide occupational qualification affirmative 
defense).403  Posner’s true concurrences are characterized by 
concerns about avoiding hasty judicial decision making without 
concrete facts and legal doctrine, about having courts steer clear of 
reviewing essentially political questions which are better left to 
other institutions, and about proper understanding and application 
399 EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 529 (7th Cir. 2001) (reh’g en banc) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
400 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
401 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
402 See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text. 
403 See supra notes 280–85 and accompanying text. 
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of legal doctrine by courts.  From the standpoint of law and 
aesthetics, Posner’s true concurrences are best understood as 
articulations of “grid aesthetic” (visions of what the specific rules, 
doctrines, standards and principles should properly be in a case) 
with occasional explorations of “energy aesthetic” (issues of tension 
or synergy between competing legal conceptions).404
Yet, Judge Posner tends to file more two-cents concurrences—
announcing that “the author is willing to join in both the outcome 
and rationale sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add [his] 
own, presumably consistent, thoughts on the matter.”405  Indeed, 
because of the quantity and variety of Posner’s concurring opinions, 
which ostensibly agree with the majority opinion in the case, we 
might be tempted to argue that he finds it appealing to offer his 
fifty-cents worth.  Thus, we find Posnerian enhancements, 
embellishments, and upgrades to the majority opinions of his 
Seventh Circuit colleagues in the category of concurrences which I 
have called “Posner as Congressional Adviser” cases.406  Judge 
Posner relishes policy analysis and loves to consider the multiple 
facets of public problems.  Take his exhaustive essay on federal 
habeas corpus rights of state prisoners in his concurring opinion in 
United States v. Franzen: In the course of this separate opinion he 
considered principles of federalism, the morale of state court judges, 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, the efficiency of 
judges’ work products, the psychological well-being of habeas 
petitioners, the accuracy of constitutional determinations, and the 
historical background which gave rise to Congress’ enactment of the 
most recent statute on habeas corpus.407  Take his thorough review 
of the wisdom of federal courts getting involved in intra-state, local 
securities fraud cases in the course of his concurring opinion in 
Trecker v. Scag.408  Consider Posner’s concurrence in United States 
v. D’Antoni where he looks at the purported logic of the federal 
maximum sentence statute for conspiracy to kill a federal witness, 
and ends up canvassing the federal criminal code with a 
404 See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051 
(2002).  Schlag’s grid aesthetic pictures law as follows: The grid is “a two-dimensional area 
divided into contiguous, well-bounded legal spaces.  These spaces are divided into doctrines, 
rules, and the like.  Those doctrines, rules, and the like are further divided into elements, and 
so on and so forth.”  Id.  The energy aesthetic involves “[c]onflicting forces of principle, policy, 
values, and politics [which] collide and combine in sundry ways.”  Id. 
405 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
406 See supra Part III.B.1. 
407 See supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text. 
408 See supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text. 
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comparative eye, and offering straightforward advice for a 
legislative reworking of key sentencing provisions.409  Posner’s Law 
and Economics category of concurrences sometimes embody his 
over-interpreting or overdoing the costs and benefits of various legal 
issues with too much analysis.  His Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. 
v. City of Chicago concurring opinion is a prime example of this 
tendency.  In that opinion, Judge Posner got carried away with his 
economic reasoning to a degree that some of his analysis on the 
likely impacts of Chicago’s rent control ordinance took on the 
coloration of rank speculation.410  Still, Posner’s two-cents 
concurrences often add a vital perspective to a controversy.  Go back 
to his Archie v. City of Racine concurring opinion and see how he 
does a better job than the majority opinion of explaining the failure 
of survivors to make out a Section 1983 claim against a municipal 
ambulance dispatcher.  Posner combines a weighing of textual, 
precedential, and policy considerations which tilt in favor of denying 
the claim while acknowledging the human pathos (and possible 
second class treatment) received by the black decedent from the 
white dispatcher.411
What strikes me as the most interesting general observation 
about the quarter century of Posnerian concurring judicial opinions, 
though, is Judge Posner’s virtuosity in strategically inspiring 
consubstantiality with other judges on the Seventh Circuit.  In this 
regard, Posner uses concurrences as rhetorical tropes to unite 
subscribing judges of the majority with his own spin on the law by 
delicately exploiting ambiguity to unite divergent tendencies on the 
appellate court and by persuasively condensing competing values in 
a case at a sufficiently abstract level.412  While Posner sometimes is 
ham-handed in a quest for consubstantiality by overplaying his 
hand with too much detail which can not be reasonably merged with 
the reasoning of the majority opinion,413 think about those 
concurring performances where he pulls off fundamental agreement 
with his views of the law and the outcome of the case by subtly 
orchestrating abstract agreement with the majority.  Think about 
409 See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
410 See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
411 See supra notes 215–23 and accompanying text.  By bringing to bear his unique 
perspective on the law (combining economics, deft interpretation, and sympathy for the 
underdog), Judge Posner’s two-cents concurrences are characterized by what Schlag has 
called a perspectivist aesthetic.  See Schlag, supra note 404, at 1052. 
412 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
413 See, e.g., supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text. 
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his uses of ambiguity in the statutory interpretation case of Michels 
v. United States Olympic Committee.  In that case Posner 
rhetorically persuaded the majority to disallow an athlete’s attempt 
to use the federal courts to second-guess amateur athletic 
organizational decision making; his ostensible agreement that the 
disgruntled weightlifter could not use a federal statute to privately 
enforce his own claim was backed up by the rhetorically persuasive 
observation that even if the statute could be privately enforced, the 
weightlifter’s lawsuit would have to be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim.414  Or contemplate Posner’s strategic concurrence with the 
dismissal of the mortgagor’s appeal in United States v. OCCI Co., 
where he expressed ambiguous doubt about the continued validity 
of precedent that allowed a mortgagor to assert an affirmative 
defense of noncompliance by HUD with the broad national housing 
objectives set forth in the federal statute, and cleverly 
characterizing the substance of those national housing objectives as 
nothing more than “hopes and homilies” with “few specifics.”415  Or 
meditate on the ingenious way that Judge Posner advances the 
overarching attractiveness of a purposeful method of statutory 
construction by his strategic concurrence in Marozsan v. United 
States.  He agreed with the majority opinion which construed a 
federal veterans benefit statute as allowing judicial review of an 
administrative agency determination; he supported his concurrence 
with ambiguous general comments that would be hard for his 
colleagues to disagree with, to wit, “the deficiencies of literalism as 
a style of statutory interpretation” coupled with his denigration of 
“[t]he idea that semantically unambiguous sentences—sentences 
clear ‘on their face’—sentences whose meaning is ‘plain’—can be 
interpreted without reference to purpose inferred from context” in a 
statutory scheme.416
B.  The Aesthetics of Judicial Concurring Style 
What thoughts does our detailed examination of the concurring 
opinion oeuvre of Judge Richard A. Posner inspire regarding the 
uses and attractiveness (or lack of attractiveness) of judicial 
appellate concurrences?  What follows are some tentative and half-
baked notes and unanswered questions. 
414 See supra notes 329–36 and accompanying text. 
415 See supra notes 337–38 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text. 
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1. While law makes moral claims by its very nature, law can 
also be, as John Gardner of Oxford’s University College has written, 
“regarded and evaluated as . . . an object of aesthetic appreciation: 
as a literary genre, an intellectual architecture, a social spectacle, 
and so on.”417  Thus, just as “[l]awyers not infrequently come to 
think of their work as one might think of a work of art, prizing 
elegance, coherence, balance, and other aesthetic virtues, over 
moral virtues such as honesty, generosity, and humanity,”418 
appellate judges and the readers of appellate judicial opinions may 
come to value aesthetics over morality.  Is such valuation legitimate 
and proper?  Are concurring appellate judicial opinions 
“mainly . . . object[s] of aesthetic criticism, mainly suited to being 
deconstructed and transfigured and problematized?”419  On a higher 
plane: “Is there any authentic moral insight lurking within an 
aesthetics of law [and concurring judicial opinions]?  Does 
approaching the law [and concurring judicial opinions] 
as . . . object[s] of aesthetic appreciation count as any more than a 
vain distraction from the real job of revealing [their] moral 
strengths and weaknesses?”420  According to one take on these 
questions, based on “the web of Nietzsche’s revisionist aesthetics 
morality,” indeed, “the highest admiration is reserved for the testing 
of one’s creative limits, and . . . true virtue lies in overcoming all 
that constrains and dampens the human spirit.”421  Seen in such a 
light, appellate concurring opinions might be used more creatively 
by judges to add to, improve, and enrich the law.  But are there 
examples of “good” creativity and “bad” creativity in the production 
of judicial concurrences? 
2. Can creative judicial concurring opinions be more 
imaginatively conceived and fashioned by appellate judges to assist 
in the greater production of good legal ideas?422  Is it wrong for 
appellate judges to use their concurrences to float ideas to the 
legislature, the executive, or the administrative agencies?  If so, 
why is it wrong?  If it is not wrong, how can concurrences be 
417 John Gardner, General Editor’s Preface to ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, at vii 
(John Gardner ed., 2001). 
418 Id. 
419 Id. 
420 Id. at viii. 
421 Id. 
422 Cf. PETER WATSON, IDEAS: A HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND INVENTION FROM FIRE TO 
FREUD 10 (2005) (discussing as one of the main failures in the field of intellectual history: the 
“failure among both historians and scientists to get to grips with ‘imagination’ as a dimension 
in life generally and in particular so far as the production of ideas is concerned”). 
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improved to better help these non-judicial legal institutions?  
Moreover, how can concurring judicial opinions be improved to 
better help an appellate court refine and evolve its legal doctrine in 
discrete substantive and procedural areas?  How can concurring 
judicial opinions be improved to assist higher appellate courts (i.e., 
a supreme court in a jurisdiction) refine and evolve legal doctrine? 
3. How does the view that judicial concurring opinions are 
strategically used by appellate judges to advance consubstantiality 
through artful use of ambiguous language423 fit with the notion that 
concurring opinions can help improve the law over time?424
4. Among the four major types of legal aesthetics—the grid 
aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspectivist aesthetic, and the 
dissociative aesthetic425—what aesthetics do appellate judges favor 
when they craft concurring opinions?  Remember, we have seen that 
when Judge Posner writes a true concurring opinion his style tends 
to reflect the grid aesthetic and the energy aesthetic.426  Posner’s 
two-cents concurrences, however, are characterized by a 
perspectivist aesthetic.427  Posner’s use of the dissociative aesthetic 
is rare (in his concurrences); but his concurring opinion in United 
States v. McKinney fits the bill of lawyers or judges talking past one 
another, with Judge Posner willing to judicially innovate to arrive 
at a more workable and coherent standard of review in criminal 
probable cause cases, and the majority opinion finding such judicial 
innovation totally inappropriate in light of purported Supreme 
Court precedent which already established the standard of 
review.428  Do appellate judges learn from one another when a 
dissociative aesthetic appears in a colleague’s concurring opinion?  
Or, do ideological positions harden in such cases?  Are these types of 
423 See supra notes 413–14 and accompanying text. 
424 See supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra notes 404, 411 and accompanying text.  Schlag defines the dissociative 
aesthetic of law as follows: 
Nothing is what it is, but is always already something else.  Any attempt to refer to X is 
frustrated, as even the most minimal inquiry reveals that X is an unstable glomming-on 
of many other things that cannot be subsumed or stabilized within any one thing.  The 
crucial contributions of the prior aesthetics . . . have all collapsed.  No determinable 
identities, relations, or perspectives survive. 
Schlag, supra note 404, at 1052. 
426 See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
427 See supra note 411 and accompanying text. 
428 See supra notes 375–83 and accompanying text.  Compare United States v. McKinney, 
919 F.2d 405, 421 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[O]nly in law is ‘innovative’ a 
pejorative.”), with id. at 409 (majority opinion) (disparaging Posner’s proposed approach as 
inappropriate and involving “bold initiatives” which flew in the face of Supreme Court 
precedent). 
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raw concurrences helpful to the Supreme Court Justices reviewing 
an issue where there are conflicting views on the Court of 
Appeals?429
5. As recent critical scholarship has argued, lawyers and judges 
should return to the classical view of law as a creative enterprise 
that is deeply dependent on persuasive narration and literary 
prowess.  As explained in the introduction of a 1999 book entitled 
Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law: 
Law’s art has been recently explored from a literary 
perspective.  The school of jurisprudence variously described 
as “law and literature” or “literary jurisprudence” has 
revived the classical tradition for which successful law was 
perceived as a felicitous language and instruction into the 
legal arcana involved an introduction to the power of 
beautiful speech.  The earliest customs and laws of Greece 
took the form of legends, myths, and tales, the earliest judge 
was a histor.  The first legal form was the narrative, and the 
great lawgivers—Solon, Lycurgus, Plato himself—were 
successful narrators. . . . Demosthenes and Cicero were 
instructed in forensic rhetoric and the felicitous uses of 
speech and oratorical skill as well as in legal technique and 
procedure. 
 In a more general sense, throughout history law has been 
the performative language par excellence, a language whose 
success is measured by its consequences, its ability to act on 
the world.430
Persuasive narration of law—and its impact on human beings and 
social institutions in the real world—is a role to be played not only 
by paid advocates in a case but by appellate judges who are troubled 
by some dimension of a case on appeal.  A potentially useful way of 
429 Adam Gearey discusses a law and aesthetics concept stemming from the work of 
Roberto Unger which to my mind is similar to Schlag’s dissociative aesthetic of law.  He 
observes: 
 [Roberto Unger’s work], more than any other recent manifestation of American 
Critical Legal Studies, has a vision of aesthetic ‘negative capability’ at its core.  Negative 
capability emerges as the most recent development of a perennial concern, the capacity 
to reinvent our emotional connection with others outside institutional structures that are 
meant to contain and condition them. 
GEAREY, supra note 417, at 99; cf. Schlag, supra note 404, at 1098 (noting that the 
“breakdown and reconstruction is perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in law”). 
430 Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction to LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY 
OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 10 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999) 
(emphasis added). 
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thinking about some concurring opinions (and, perhaps, many 
dissenting opinions) is to think of these appellate opinions as 
performative language which seeks to develop alternative visions of 
the meaning and potential of law.  Thus, being concerned about the 
aesthetics of judicial concurring opinion style can help lawyers and 
judges to restate and reconceptualize the law.  As law and 
aesthetics theorists have written in this regard: “If the law works 
through the creation and projection of ordered worlds, attention to 
style, detail, and form will help one understand law’s hidden vision 
and develop alternative worlds and visions that derive their 
legitimacy from repressed texts, histories, and traditions.”431  Based 
on this idea, would we conclude that Judge Posner is an artistic 
concurring judge (some, most, or all of the time)?  How would we 
grade other appellate judges? 
6. If we are to take concurring judicial opinions seriously—by 
expecting that some opinions might help improve the law over time 
as other judges take a second look at particular legal doctrines, 
principles, interpretations and the like—we should also consider the 
aesthetic musings of Philip Fisher who has written an entire book 
on the human “ongoing [provisional] project of making sense” of the 
world “rather than the nature of knowing” things in the sense of 
“what Descartes called certain knowledge.”432  A good judicial 
concurring opinion, then, might be thought of in terms of which 
Fisher has described as “a common poetics of wonder, a map of the 
features of thinking that guide us to satisfaction and a feeling of 
intelligibility within experience” not “knowing” it in Cartesian terms 
of clear and distinct ideas.433
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article started off with some background thoughts and 
differing views on the general nature of concurring judicial opinions.  
Then, after a brief statistical overview of Judge Richard A. Posner’s 
concurrences during his first twenty-five years as a federal 
431 Id.  These interdisciplinary scholars define their project in broader terms as well: 
 This collection [of essays] is the first attempt to develop a specifically legal iconology, 
to draw on the critical procedures of law, art history, and cultural studies in order to 
consolidate a new interdisciplinary field of visual culture and law.  The focus is on the 
diverse interfaces between law and the artistic image. 
Id. at 11. 
432 PHILIP FISHER, WONDER, THE RAINBOW, AND THE AESTHETICS OF RARE EXPERIENCES 8 
(1998). 
433 Id. (emphasis added). 
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appellate judge, ten ways to look at Posner’s concurrences were 
explored: (1) Posner as congressional adviser—opinions that 
highlight his far-ranging intellect and energy; (2) law and economics 
analysis which is the leitmotif of many of his judicial opinions; (3) 
Posner as an institutional critic; (4) two views on whether Judge 
Posner is a nitpicker in his opinions; (5) instances of the law 
professor as judge by reference to various hypothetical examples set 
forth in Posner’s opinions; (6) Posner’s penchant for cutting Gordian 
Knots in his opinions; (7) his pragmatic reading and interpretation 
of statutes; (8) Posner’s focus on arriving at appropriate standards 
of judicial review; (9) the bracing directness and frank commentary 
in his opinions; and (10) Judge Posner’s willingness to add his 
thoughts and takes in en banc cases before the entire appellate 
court. 
The Article, then, transitioned from specific commentary to 
general observations.  First, I characterized the over-arching style of 
Judge Posner’s concurring opinions as focused on strategic 
inspiration of consubstantiality—building analytical bridges with 
his judicial colleagues’ opinions on matters of law and policy that 
are important to Posner.  Second, I dipped into the nascent 
literature on law and aesthetics to explore some potential larger 
purposes of judicial concurring opinions, in general, and to raise 
some unanswered questions. 
 
